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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Never before—including even the glory days of the Roman Empire—has 
one military so towered over all others on the planet.   
Eliot Cohen1  
 
A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Civil-military relations have been defined simply as the interaction between the 
armed forces and the society they serve.2  As a nation founded by men mistrustful of 
standing armies, America and its professional military have a history of strained 
relations.3  Now, as we begin the twenty-first century, civil-military relations remain an 
important topic in the nation.  With the end of the Cold War, America now finds itself the 
lone military superpower of the world.  No longer required to contain communism, our 
armed forces policed an empire for a short time of “Pax Americana.”  Now engaged in a 
war against terrorism, the military is once again in the spotlight.  The relationship 
between America and its military is adjusting to this new reality, but not without tension 
and some reasons for concern. 
The relationship between civilians and their military has undergone a significant 
change in the past twenty years.  The powerful military of the 1980s, under President 
Reagan, witnessed the demise of the Soviet Union.  Under President Bush, the armed 
forces vanquished Iraq in Desert Storm.  This triumph and euphoria, however, gave way 
to feelings of confusion and frustration among many in the military during President 
Clinton’s terms.  Drawdowns and cutbacks, coupled with seemingly muddled, unpopular, 
and more numerous peacekeeping missions increased tensions between the military and 
the administration.4  Some members of the media and academics became concerned that 
                                                 
 1 Eliot A. Cohen, “Why the Gap Matters,” The National Interest (Fall 2000):  41. 
 2 Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, “The Current State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations: 
An Introduction,” U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, edited by Don M. Snider and 
Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (Washington, D. C.:  The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 
18. 
 3 James Clotfelter, The Military in American Politics (New York:  Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973),  
10-27. 
 4 Don Snider, John Nagl, and Tony Pfaff, “Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership 
in the 21st Century,” West Point and American Military Culture web site. 
2 
the military was growing “out of control”5 and becoming isolated from civilian society 
by a widening cultural “gap.”6   
 
B.  ELECTION 2000 AND THE MILITARY 
Concerns about civil-military relations continued through the 2000 Presidential 
election, where absentee military votes may very well have determined the outcome.7  
This paper examines several interesting questions related to the military vote in the 
election of 2000.  First, has the military become a political interest group much like labor 
unions?  Next, what is the effect of the so-called cultural gap on the military vote?  Also, 
what was the effect of the Clinton administration on how the military voted?  What are 
the effects of peer and social pressure on how people in the military vote?  Finally, what 
did people in the military think of the candidates and for whom did they eventually vote? 
Some writers have claimed the military was manipulated by the Republican Party 
to win the election and was just another partisan political interest group.8  Did the 
military endorse candidates or appear at political functions?  Were military members 
encouraged to vote for a candidate?  Were votes guaranteed to a particular candidate for 
promised policies?  If such claims were true, they would mark a serious departure from 
the military’s traditional role as an “apolitical servant of the state” and could indicate a 
decline in professionalism.9   
                                                 
5 Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” The National Interest  
(Spring 1994):  3. 
6 Thomas E. Ricks, “On American Soil: The Widening Gap Between The U.S. Military and U.S. 
Society,” Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Working Paper No. 3 (Harvard University, May 1996) , 3. 
7 The results of the election may be debated for years to come.  President Bush’s margin of victory in 
the state of Florida varies from the official margin of 537 votes to a deficit of 332 votes, depending on the 
standards used to count votes.  “Deadlocked Again:  Newspapers Find No Clear Winner in Ballot Review,” 
The Associated Press, http://www.abcNEWS.com, 10 May 2001.  “Bush still wins Florida in newspaper 
recount,” CNN, http://www.CNN.com, 4 April 2001.  It was estimated that as many as 7,000 overseas 
absentee votes in Florida were counted after election day.  A majority of these were assumed to be by 
military.  These votes may have given Bush victory.  “Priority Mail: Overseas Absentee Ballots May Be 
Key to Election,” http://www.abcNEWS.com, 14 November 2000. 
8 Richard L. Berke, “Democrats Seek Inquiry On Florida Vote Count,” New York Times, 16 July  
2001. 
9 Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, “The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians and their Mutual 
Misunderstanding,” The National Interest (Fall 2000):  34. 
3 
The results of the election suggested that the American people as a whole are 
somewhat evenly divided between the two major parties.10  Recent literature claims that 
the vast majority of members of the military have become increasingly conservative, both 
socially and politically.11  This suggests an increasing cultural gap between the military 
and the American people it serves.  Some have suggested this conservatism and the gap 
are simply the basic nature of the military’s function and mindset.12  One must ask, 
however: Are this gap and the apparently unbalanced representation of political views in 
the military acceptable in a liberal democratic society where the armed forces vote? 
Next, what effect did serving under President Clinton have on how the military 
voted?  President Clinton’s poor relationship with the military was well documented.13  
Perceptions regarding his lack of service during Vietnam and his campaign promise to lift 
the military’s ban on gays planted seeds of mistrust in the military establishment from the 
beginning.14  His conduct later and the subsequent impeachment may have had an impact 
as well on how many in the military viewed him both personally and as a leader.  Should 
the Commander-in-Chief be held to a higher moral standard, just as the officers who 
serve under him?  Did eight years under President Clinton influence the voting behavior 
of many members of the military? 
After election night 2000, it became apparent that military votes were significant 
to the outcome.  Many people automatically assumed that the majority of people in the 
military voted Republican.15  Indeed, do people in the military vote as a bloc?  Do peer 
pressure and socialization drive military members to vote for a particular candidate?  If 
                                                 
10 The popular vote was 50,996,116 for Gore, 50,456,169 for Bush.  Forty eight percent versus forty 
eight percent respectively.  http://www.CNN.com 
11 Ricks, “On American Soil,” 10-11. 
12 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  The Belknap Press, 1957) , 79. 
13 Mark J. Eitelberg and Roger D. Little, “Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold 
War,” in U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, edited by Don M. Snider and Miranda A. 
Carlton-Carew (Washington, D. C.:  The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995) , 50. 
14 Andrea Stone, “Bush gets cheers in the barracks,” USA Today, 8 January 2001, 1. 
15 “Military Vote in Florida Could Cement Bush Victory,” http://www.NewsMax.com, 9 November 
2000.  Bill Sammon, “Stiffing The Troops Serving Overseas,” The Washington Times, 8 May 2001.  
Richard L. Berke, “Lieberman Put Democrats In Retreat On Military Vote,” New York Times, 15 July 
2001. 
4 
this were true, what factors would cause people in the military to vote for the same 
candidate? 
All these factors combined may have affected the opinions of people in the 
military.  Both Al Gore and George W. Bush campaigned for a strong military.16  What 
did people in the military think of these two candidates?  On what grounds were they 
evaluated?  What made one a better choice for President in the minds of military voters?   
 
C.  MARINE CORPS OFFICERS AND THE ELECTION 
When discussing America’s military, it is important not to overlook the place of 
the United States Marine Corps.  The Marine Corps has been called a unique force in 
readiness and some think it has the strongest service culture.17  Yet, much of academic 
literature seems to focus on civil-military relations in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  
Described as “extremists” by some,18 Marines have a culture and ethos that have earned 
them a reputation as one of the world’s premier fighting forces.  As an organization 
dedicated to victory in battle, should its members be set apart from a civilian society 
concerned with peace and prosperity, or should civilian and military values be the same?  
For example, should we expect military and civilian voting patterns to be the same?  If 
military voting behavior is so different from that of civilians, it will surely be evident in 
how Marine officers viewed the election.  Why would their voting behavior be as skewed 
to the right, as some claim?19  Would it confirm a decline in professionalism and a rise in 
partisanship?  Does it validate the opinions of those who think the military is “out of 
touch” and should more closely resemble society?  Could their voting behavior be a 
manifestation of their frustration with serving under the Clinton administration?  Do 
socialization and peer pressure result in officers voting for the same candidate?  Who did 
Marine officers think was the better candidate, and why? 
                                                 
16 “A Case for the Defense: Gore, Bush Both Hawks on Security Matters,” 
http://www.abcNEWS.com. 
17 American Military Culture in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., Joseph J. 
Collins, and T. O. Jacobs (Washington, D.C.:  Center For Strategic and International Studies, 2000) , 13. 
18 Rowan Scarborough, “Top Army woman apologizes for calling Marines ‘extremists’: Veterans, 
Gingrich, others on Hill demand she be fired,” Washington Times, 14 November 1997, 5. 
19 Kohn, “Out of Control,” 7. 
5 
D.  PRAETORIAN GUARD OR LOYAL CENTURIONS? 
The primary objective of this study is to determine some of the factors that may 
have influenced Marine officers’ voting behavior in the 2000 Presidential election and 
what it may mean to society.  One may conclude that there is a problem when the 
American people “assume” the military will vote for a particular candidate.  It follows 
that this expectation or image may compromise the military’s apolitical and professional 
nature, and generate mistrust between civilians and the men and women who serve them.  
If Marine officers’ votes were indeed so generally different from those of the American 
electorate, then it is important that the American people understand why.    
Some writers have found similarities between the U.S. military and ancient 
Imperial Rome’s Praetorian Guard.20  Originally formed as the emperor’s bodyguard, the 
Praetorians ended up controlling the government by overthrowing emperors and picking 
new ones.  The existence of Praetorianism is often the first symptom and cause of a 
state’s decline.21  So, in the presidential election of 2000, did Marine Corps officers 
exhibit the characteristics of a “Praetorian Guard,” or can they still be considered 
America’s loyal centurions, obediently guarding the far-flung borders and exerting 
America’s will on command? 
                                                 
20 William Pfaff, “The Praetorian Guard,” The National Interest 62 (Winter 2000/01):  57. 
21 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, New 
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7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PARTY ON VOTE? 
No nation’s armed forces remain apart from politics.  Politics is concerned 
with the distribution of values and power within a society—and the 
military can hardly be prevented from participating in that process in some 
manner.                       
Welch and Smith22 
 
This section examines the notion that the military of the early 21st century has 
become a partisan interest group.  It would seem odd to equate the military to the United 
Auto Workers, but, in the heated days just before and after the presidential election, such 
comparisons were made, especially when it became evident that military absentee votes 
could determine the outcome in Bush’s favor.23  Democratic Party pundits assumed the 
military votes would favor Bush and the Republican Party.24  This is a problem, because 
most people agree that partisan politics and the military do not mix.  As Samuel 
Huntington writes in his seminal work, The Soldier and the State:  “Politics is beyond the 
scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics 
undermines their professionalism….The military officer must remain neutral 
politically.”25  And Janowitz asserts in The Professional Soldier, that military 
professionals “do not attach themselves to political parties or overtly display 
partisanship.”26  Elected leaders need politically neutral advice from disinterested 
military professionals to make unbiased decisions.  The military also needs to maintain 
bipartisan support in Congress to sustain funding.27  This leaves us with a question 
concerning the recent election.  What is the effect of political party affiliation on soldiers’ 
votes?  In other words, has the military really become a partisan political interest group, 
                                                 
22 Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military 
Relations (North Scituate, Massachusetts:  Duxbury Press, 1974) , 5. 
23 www.Time.com/Message Board.  Although this is not the most academic of sources, the fact that 
some people would make this claim means the impression has been made on the general public. 
24 Bill Sammon, “Stiffing The Troops Serving Overseas,” The Washington Times, 8 May 2001. 
25 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  The Belknap Press, 1957) , 71. 
26 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois:  The 
Free Press, 1960) , 233-234. 
27 Drew A. Bennett, “The Long View of Politics,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 1997, 53. 
8 
or does it remain a force of otherwise disinterested professionals?  Are military officers 
the “hard-right” Republicans, as some believe?  Why do officers apparently prefer the 
Republican Party?  And how do Marine officers, in particular, feel about political 
partisanship? 
 
1. Is the Military a Republican Political Interest Group?  
To start, the conflict between those in the military and the Democratic Party has a 
history.  In their article, “Grand Army of the Republicans,” Bacevich and Kohn observe 
that, “Republicans have regarded the military as a political interest group to be showered 
with benefits just as Democrats court teachers’ unions and environmental groups.”28  
According to Bacevich and Kohn, since the Vietnam War and the seeming abandonment 
of the military by liberals and the Democrats, “the Republicans have become the ‘avatars’ 
of a strong national defense, and, by extension, champions of the honor and prerogatives 
of America’s fighting men.”29  Donnelly’s article, “Why Soldiers Dislike Democrats,” 
also traces the rift between the military and the Democratic Party to the Vietnam War.  
Donnelly writes:  “Once Vietnam ceased to be Lyndon Johnson’s war and became 
Richard Nixon’s war, Democrats often allowed opposition to the war to become 
contempt for all things military, including ‘baby killers’ in uniform.”  Donnelly believes 
the military “weakness” of the Carter years rekindled the shame of Vietnam and that 
“Democrats also trumpeted their opposition to the defense build-up of the Reagan years.  
Not only did they complain about Reagan’s spending increases, but they derided his 
simple patriotism and obvious love for the military.”30  Bacevich and Kohn believe that, 
as a result, many in the military credit President Reagan’s build-up of the armed forces in 
the 1980s with restoring the pride and self-esteem of career soldiers still scarred by 
Vietnam.  The patriotism of the Reagan era also influenced many conservatives to join 
the All-Volunteer Force, which may account for the current ideological imbalance in 
today’s military.  Bacevich and Kohn assert that Republicans sent the message that they 
                                                 
28 Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, “Grand Army of the Republicans,” The New Republic,  
8 December 1997, 22. 
29 Ibid., 22. 
30 Tom Donnelly, “Why Soldiers Dislike Democrats:  In the mythology of military life, the 
Democratic party is the enemy,” The Weekly Standard, 4 December 2000. 
9 
cared about the military and backed it up with spending.31  Donnelly writes: “The second 
powerful myth that shapes today’s military—the glorious victory in the Gulf War—also 
features the theme of Democratic perfidy, in the form of the partisan vote in Congress on 
whether to go to war.”  And he continues: “The Lewinsky scandal and the impeachment 
of Clinton further alienated the military from the Democrats….”32 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that military officers strongly favor the Republican 
Party.  As Bacevich and Kohn write, “today’s officers scorn ‘liberalism’ and all its 
works, and consider Democrats presumptively anti-military and therefore 
untrustworthy.”33  As an example, Kohn notes the publicly hostile actions of the military 
toward President Clinton and the public affection for Republican politicians and causes.34  
In following a recruit platoon through training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris 
Island, Thomas Ricks perceived that Marine officers were openly identifying with the 
Republican Party as the norm, overwhelmingly “hard-right Republican,” and “largely 
comfortable with the views of Rush Limbaugh.”35  Ricks realizes that there has always 
been a conservative streak in the military, much as journalists tend to be liberals, but he 
suspects that Marines are now more conservative and politically active than ever before.  
According to Ricks, a professor at West Point found that, for her cadets, “being a 
Republican has become part of the definition of being a military officer,” and that they 
believed “the Democratically-controlled congress was Public Enemy No. 1.  No. 2 was 
the liberal media.”36   
Recent surveys support the claim that the majority of officers identify with the 
Republican Party.  Ricks cites a 1995 survey of Marine Corps officers that showed over 
50 percent of new second lieutenants identified themselves as conservatives, increasing to 
69 percent in the higher ranks.37  Another survey by Holsti also supports the assertion 
that officers have become more partisan politically.  Holsti found that, from 1976 to                                                  
31 Bacevich and Kohn, 22. 
32 Donnelly, 2. 
33 Bacevich and Kohn, 22. 
34 Kohn, 3. 
35 Ricks, “On American Soil,” 11. 
36 Ibid., 11. 
37 Ibid., 12. 
10 
1996, officers who claimed they were Republicans climbed from 33 percent to 67 
percent, while those claiming to be Democrats declined from 12 percent to only 7 
percent.  At the same time, officers who claimed Independent affiliation went from 46 
percent to 22 percent.38  In Holsti’s opinion, “On the face of it, a large military that is 
becoming more politically active at the same time it is increasingly concentrated on one 
end of the partisan and ideological spectrum is a cause for concern.”39  Citing this 
evidence that the majority of officers consider themselves Republicans, Bacevich and 
Kohn feel that having “a politicized military, not to mention one whose officer corps is so 
closely identified with one party, is both bad for the services and bad for democracy.”40    
In recent elections, retired generals and admirals have publicly endorsed 
candidates for both parties, but more recently it seems that many more have endorsed 
Republicans.  Bacevich and Kohn think this also indicates a rise in Republican 
partisanship as well as a change in the military from conservative temperament to 
conservative ideology.41  Kohn asserts in another article:   
The military should not participate in any fashion in politics….If officers 
belong to a political party, run for office, represent a particular group or 
constituency, publicly express their views (and vote), attack or defend the 
executive leadership—in short, behave like politicians—they cannot be 
trusted to be neutral servants of the state and guardians of society.42   
 
There is also concern that a larger proportion of military officers vote than do 
civilians as a whole.  Kohn feels that today’s military is “out of control,” has abandoned a 
century-and-a-half tradition of non-partisanship, and has begun “thinking, voting, and 
even espousing Republicanism with a capital R.”43  Thus, Bacevich and Kohn believe the 
military should follow General George C. Marshall’s example of political neutrality and 
                                                 
38 Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 
1976-1996,” Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Working Paper No. 13 (Harvard University, May 1996) , 4. 
39 Holsti, 18. 
40 Bacevich and Kohn, 24. 
41 Ibid., 24. 
42 Richard H. Kohn, “The Forgotten Fundamentals of Civilian Control of the Military in Democratic 
Government,” Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Working Paper No. 11 (Harvard University, May 1996) , 16. 
43 Kohn, “Out of Control,” 7. 
11 
not vote.44  Ricks adds: “Not only do today’s officers appear to be more conservative 
than in the past, they also appear to be more active in politics, both in their identification 
and their voting behavior.”  And, while no more than 1 in 500 officers cast a ballot 
following the Civil War, today, “after historically shying away from voting, military 
personnel for the last decade have been voting in greater percentages than that of the 
general population.”45  Ricks feels that this is cause for some concern, because “when the 
military is politically active it edges towards being an independent actor in domestic 
politics.”46  Research by Feaver and Kohn suggests that  
the long tradition of a military without a conscious association with a 
particular political party has given way to a new reality.  While the 
officers surveyed continue to consider themselves neutral servants of the 
state, they have developed a more distinctive partisan identity.47   
 
Some feel that the growth of this partisan identity alone will result in the military 
being viewed as “just another conservative special interest group.”48   Indeed, one writer 
suggests that some Democrats may already perceive the military as a Republican entity as 
evidenced by an organized effort to disqualify military absentee ballots in Florida after 
the election.49  Kohn and Feaver believe that, if this trend continues, it could result in the 
armed forces losing general public and financial support.  They assert that, although 
public confidence overall in the military remains high, it is also brittle and shallow. 
Civilian authorities would trust military advice less, and professionalism would decline.  
Further, the authors argue that an armed force identified with the Republican Party would 
hurt military recruiting, as people of different political leanings would be discouraged 
from joining.50 
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2.  The Military as Apolitical Professionals? 
So far, there is evidence that military officers have a greater affinity for the 
Republican Party and that a greater proportion of them vote than does the general 
population.  In contrast to those who claim there is partisanship, others write that, 
historically, partisan politics are generally regarded as distasteful and dirty to professional 
soldiers, since politicians are seen as too self-serving and corrupt.51  As Janowitz writes: 
“According to the definition of military honor, the professional soldier is ‘above politics’ 
in domestic affairs.”  Janowitz also asserts that the military is not a unified political 
force.52  According to Clotfelter, military officers have little time to lobby and pursue the 
“grassroots” activism that is required of an effective interest group.  Clotfelter believes 
that soldiers tend to dislike political parties because they have a tendency to disunite, 
divide people, and create differences.  Clotfelter also writes that, in general, the modern 
military in America has had little to do with active partisanship, especially in the “smoke-
filled room” sense.53    
One of the main concerns of those who fear military partisanship is that people in 
the military are now voting in greater proportions than in the general public.54  Some, 
however, do not believe that voting is necessarily partisan.  The military and voting in the 
U.S. have a history.  Westermann, for example, believes that Kohn’s contention 
regarding the American military’s century-and-a-half tradition of nonpartisanship is 
“misleading and debatable.”  Westermann asserts that military and veteran votes strongly 
affected the elections of Lincoln, Grant, and Harrison.55   One reason few soldiers voted 
after the Civil War might be that some states denied the vote to soldiers during that era.  
Clotfelter found that, as late as 1904, certain states denied the vote to “idiots, paupers, 
Indians, soldiers, and sailors.”56  In contrast to assertions that voting is improper for 
soldiers, Huntington points out that, in previous eras of isolation from civilian society 
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such as in the 1920s, military members were actually encouraged to vote so that they 
would be more like “regular citizens.”57   
It is interesting to note how others view the military and voting.  The French 
approached military voting with the tradition of “la grande muette” (the great mute 
force).  Welch and Smith write that the French believed the military should not speak and 
only obey.  The French not only isolated their soldiers from political debates and partisan 
disputes, but also denied their soldiers the right to vote.  The French felt that “the soldier 
under arms…must remain a stranger to all parties and to all political strife….”and that 
“the vote is an element of discord and disunion which we do not need” for it “would 
endanger the moral authority that the chiefs must have over their subordinates….”58 This 
policy may seem reasonable, but it still resulted in attempted coups in 1958 and 1961.  By 
removing their ability to act as private citizens, French army officers felt compelled to 
make their opinions known by other means.59 
In contrast, Robert Heinlein’s science fiction novel, Starship Troopers, portrays a 
future society where the right to vote is only granted to military veterans.60  Although 
some may regard this as fanciful, Switzerland, one of the world’s older democracies, 
requires military service, as a responsibility of citizenship, to earn the right to vote.61   
Betros believes that exercising the right to vote does not make the military 
partisan.  Ricks expressed concern that the voting rates of the military have been above 
60 percent for the last four elections.62  Betros writes that much of this can be attributed 
to the Absentee Voting Act of 1986.  It established Voting Assistance programs and 
encouraged military members to vote, and it assisted them in casting absentee ballots.63   
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Laws, however, forbid the marching of troops to voting places.  And voting, while 
encouraged, is not ordered.64    
As long as no one in authority attempts to issue voting guidance, it would be 
difficult to justify denying the military’s right to vote as American citizens.  As 
Huntington writes: “In a free state the citizen did not cease to be a citizen when he 
became a soldier but rather became a soldier because he was a citizen.”65 A letter to the 
Marine Corps Gazette, responding to an article calling for political neutrality, asserts that 
Marines’ right to think about and vote is still important because “our responsibilities as 
citizens of this Nation…transcend our status as members of the military.”66  Betros 
asserts that those in the military are not party employees or activists.  According to 
Betros, they are “the consumers, not the purveyors, of the party’s partisan appeals and 
policies.”67  Betros also writes that soldiers owe no loyalty to the Republican Party, and 
voting is strictly a private act.  He observes “it does nothing to mold public opinion, 
pressure elected officials, or build political constituencies; rather, it is a right of 
citizenship.…”68 
 
3. How “Republican” Are Military Officers?  
As previously noted, some writers are concerned that officers are “hard-right” 
Republicans.  Although evidence indicates that the majority of officers prefer the 
Republican Party, they may not be as conservative or as extreme as some have claimed.     
Feaver and Kohn conducted a survey of military officers to determine the nature 
of the civil-military gap and found that officers are indeed more conservative than the 
civilian elite, but not more conservative than the general public.69  They also found that, 
contrary to Ricks' anecdotal evidence, “Their [military officers] political views are not, 
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however, the ‘hard right’ Republican positions some observers expected to see.”70  
Finally, Feaver and Kohn found high identification with the Republican Party, although 
they did not research the level of partisan activity:  
The so-called “Republicanization of the force” finding has received 
considerable attention and in some cases has been misunderstood.  While 
we discovered a remarkably high percentage of partisan association, we 
did not ask other questions on our survey about partisanship and therefore 
have no systematic evidence of a correlation between party identification 
and intensity of partisan activity.71 
   
In “Connected to Society:  Political Beliefs of U.S. Army Generals,” Dowd writes 
that, while the majority of generals surveyed for his study did identify with the 
Republican Party, their views were comparable with those of mainstream society.  Dowd 
also found that the generals were not particularly loyal to the Republican Party and often 
voted for the “man,” not the “party.”  Overall, Dowd concludes that the attitudes and 
opinions of the generals were not those of a “dissatisfied Praetorian Guard.”72 
Military officers may identify with the Republican Party at this time, because like 
most voters from a profession, they tend to support the party that they believe will look 
out for their best interests, such as national defense and the health of the armed forces.73  
Betros asserts that those in the military, however, can be just as fickle as the general 
public when it comes to party loyalty.74  Republicans do not have sole ownership of a 
platform favoring a strong defense.  The Democratic Party, too, has publicly advocated a 
strong national defense, and defense budgets in a divided Congress require a fair amount 
of bipartisan support.75  Ricks notes that, in days of shrinking budgets, Republicans could 
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be cutting spending on defense as much as Democrats and “it will be interesting to see 
how the political beliefs of the officer corps changes when it realizes that to be 
‘conservative’ is no longer necessarily to be ‘pro-defense spending.’ ”76 
 
4. Why Do Military Officers Like the Republican Party?   
One of the concerns cited previously was the military’s strong alignment with the 
Republican Party.  In addition to the history previously cited, what other factors may 
contribute?  
There are other reasons why Marines could be drawn to the Republican Party.  
According to Betros, those in the military value the group over the individual.  They 
value loyalty, obedience, discipline, and responsibility.  Betros writes that these values 
are directly opposed to what the Democratic Party has come to stand for.  Starting with 
the 1960s baby boomers, the “Democratic Party was receptive to those who embraced the 
ethos of self.”77  According to Betros, Democrats are seen as promoting the individual 
over the institution, while Republicans have become known for their emphasis on more 
group-centered values.   
Betros believes military officers also appreciate the Republican approach to use of 
the military, where, “the military is not the answer to every difficult foreign policy 
situation.”78  Betros also writes: “Republicans would maintain a strong military, but 
avoid using it unless important national interests were at stake….This perspective 
harmonizes with the attitudes of military officers….”79  In addition, Donnelly writes: 
“The Lewinsky scandal and the impeachment of Clinton further alienated the military 
from the Democrats, who troops believe abandoned any pretext of principle in favor of 
the desire to maintain power.”  Or as one officer said: “They chose party over nation.”80   
Marines have also expressed concern about “political correctness,” and that 
attempts to civilianize the military in the name of “social engineering” were degrading 
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warfighting effectiveness.81  Some people have attributed these attempts to liberal 
Democrats such as Representative Patricia Schroeder.82  Therefore, Betros asserts that a 
major reason why Marines align themselves with the Republican or Democratic Party 
could be because of their professional beliefs or values rather than party loyalty.83 
An example of this motivation for alignment with a Republican candidate was 
Bacevich and Kohn’s criticism of retired officers who endorsed George W. Bush during 
the presidential campaign of 2000.84  As noted previously, they feel that this type of 
endorsement is improper partisanship.  In rebuttal, former Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, General Charles Krulak writes:   
Just because 100 retired military chose to form a coalition to help elect 
President Bush…all operating under the Constitution they swore to uphold 
during their time in service…that doesn’t mean the military is becoming 
“too influential in politics.”  That particular effort just meant that 100 
retired military officers believed strongly that the Gore administration 
would continue the Defense Strategy of the Clinton administration and 
that would be bad for our Nation…It had nothing to do with Party…it had 
everything to do with platform.85 
 
5. Marine Officers’ Opinions on Partisanship   
Since this study focuses on the voting behavior of Marine officers, it is important 
to explore how Marine officers feel about political partisanship.  Examining articles and 
letters written for Marine Corps Gazette, the professional journal of Marine officers, 
reveals the opinions of several Marine officers regarding political involvement.   
On completing a fellowship in the office of the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Lieutenant Colonel Drew Bennett writes:  
There is a difference between politics and partisanship.  Active duty 
military personnel are prohibited from using their authority or influence to 
solicit votes for a particular candidate or issue….Marines must not be 
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partisan, but the Marine Corps does need to maintain an active and healthy 
relationship with the broad spectrum of elected political leaders without 
regard to party or ideology.86   
 
According to Lieutenant Colonel Bennett, the Marines still provide the president with his 
band, his helicopters, his sentries, and is still the “force of choice” for many types of 
missions.87  Marines also keep close ties with Congress.  Since its establishment in 1775, 
the Marine Corps has relied on Congress to keep it from extinction.  Congressional 
legislation results in force levels, funding, and equipment.  As Lieutenant Colonel 
Bennett writes: “The Marine Corps does not have a Republican, Democratic, or 
Independent Party agenda.  The oath of enlistment requires that Marines pledge to 
support and defend the Constitution and obey the orders of the President—not a specific 
political party.”88   
An “Ethical Decision Problem,” presented in the December 1998 Marine Corps 
Gazette, dealt specifically with political behavior.  Five scenarios were presented for 
readers to think about.  The scenarios involved a Sergeant Major starting an e-mail 
campaign to lobby Congress, a Lieutenant telling a Clinton joke to his platoon, an officer 
club and dinner party discussion that expressed disgust with the Democrats, and a 
commander playing Rush Limbaugh over loudspeakers to his Marines.  A Marine lawyer 
provided legal evaluations of these actions and determined most of these activities are 
violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice or against Department of Defense 
directives, with the private conversations being the lone exceptions.  Two-hundred 
officers provided their opinions and almost all agreed that action should be taken “to 
reestablish the correct apolitical tone throughout the command.”89   
Further opinions on partisanship are reflected by a Marine Corps Major who 
believes academics and political activists would use the perceived “civil-military gap” 
to associate the American military with one partisan political agenda or 
another.  In an increasingly politicized domestic environment, our political 
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objectivity is our most valued asset.  We should surrender it neither to 
forced political characterizations, nor to the seduction of publicly 
supporting a partisan agenda that coincides with our own….Political 
activism and an elitist mentality are poisons we must not imbibe.90   
 
Just prior to the presidential election, in September 2000, the Marine Corps 
Gazette published Captain Robert Bracknell’s article, “The Marine Officer’s Moral and 
Legal Imperative of Political Abstinence.”  Captain Bracknell intended his article to 
remind Marine officers of their responsibilities and obligations as the election 
approached.  Referring to two Marine officers who wrote disparaging articles about 
President Clinton during the impeachment scandal, he explains the legal and ethical 
reasons why Marines should not speak out against the President as well as why they 
cannot be politically active.  He writes:  “We are, by design and by history’s decree, a 
nonpolitical Corps of Marines.”91  Bracknell emphasizes Marines must remain a corps of 
professional warriors ready to obey orders at a moment’s notice whose loyalty to civilian 
control is beyond question.  He also refers to an e-mail from the Assistant Commandant 
of the Marine Corps, General Dake.  General Dake’s e-mail was sent to all Marine 
general officers in response to newspaper articles claiming Marine officers were starting 
petitions to impeach President Clinton.  The general wanted to: 
emphatically discourage such actions.  As a Corps we must remain 
focused on our responsibility as a professional military organization which 
serves at the calling of the American people.  It is unethical for individuals 
who wear the uniform of a Marine to engage in public dialogues on 
political and legal matters such as impeachment…As a Corps we must 
remain aloof of the distractions which will surely continue over the next 
months…We are not politicians.  We are not a Corps of lawyers.  We are 
warriors, nothing more, nothing less.92 
 
It should be noted that, a Marine Corps Order specifically forbids Marines from 
participating in the kind of behavior that characterizes partisan interest groups such as 
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labor unions.93  Marines are encouraged to exercise their franchise, but they are 
prohibited from partisan activities such as soliciting votes in an official capacity, 
speaking at rallies, and working for partisan campaigns, just to name a few.  According to 
the order, just about the only thing a Marine can do is to put a bumper sticker on his or 
her car and vote.94  Marines are not given voting guidance, as is often the case in unions 
and civilian organizations, and Marine Corps leaders do not promise votes or endorse any 
candidate.  As General Charles Krulak emphasizes: “The Marine Corps does not ‘openly 
identify’ with the Republican Party!”95  
  
B.  WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF MILITARY ETHOS ON VOTE? 
 
Soldiers are not as other men….War is…fought by men whose values and 
skills are not those of politicians and diplomats.  They are those of a world 
apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday 
world but does not belong to it.  Both worlds change over time, and the 
warrior adapts in step to the civilian.  It follows it, however, at a distance.  
The distance can never be closed…. 
John Keegan96 
 
Much attention has been given recently to the cultural gap that appears to exist 
between the military and civilian society.  As mentioned previously, the results of the 
election of 2000 suggests that American voters are fairly evenly divided across the 
political spectrum.  Although regional differences were still quite apparent, the margin of 
power in both houses of Congress narrowed and the American people split almost evenly 
between Gore and Bush, with Gore having a slight edge in the popular vote.  Some have 
claimed that the military, however, is far more conservative than American society and 
reflects it in their voting behavior.  They see the military’s increasing conservatism and 
supposed disdain for the society they serve and protect as dangerous.  They fear that the 
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military—isolated, different, and alienated from the very people it defends—will be 
hostile to civilian control and become a society unto itself.97 
 
1.  The Gap:  Too Extreme?  
After following a platoon through Marine Corps recruit training, Thomas Ricks 
discovered that the new Marines seemed to express an extreme disgust for civilian 
society.  According to Ricks, each new Marine experienced a moment of “private 
loathing” for civilians.98  Understanding the Marines have always been the most insular 
of the services, Ricks is still concerned that,  
over the last thirty years, as American culture has grown more fragmented, 
individualistic, and consumerist, the Marines have become more 
withdrawn….Today’s Marines give off a strong sense of disdain for the 
very society they protect.  They view it…as decadent.99  
 
Ricks believes the Marines look down on civilian society in a way that the pre-World 
War II military never did and that this isolation and increased conservatism can become 
dangerous when Marines are politically active.100  Sara Lister, Assistant Secretary of the 
Army during the Clinton administration, expressed a similar sentiment when she said:  
I think the Army is much more connected to society than the Marines are.  
The Marines are extremists.  Whenever you have extremists you’ve got 
some risks of total disconnection with society.  And that’s a little 
dangerous.101   
 
What is this “disconnection,” this gap, between Marine and civilian cultures to which 
Lister and others refer?  Should the nation be concerned that the Marines have such a 
strong and different culture?  Does the Marine Corps culture affect the voting behavior of 
its members? 
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2.  What is the Gap? 
To begin with, what is military culture?  As defined in American Military Culture 
in the Twenty-First Century:   
Military culture is an amalgam of values, customs, traditions, and their 
philosophical underpinnings that, over time, has created a shared 
institutional ethos.  From military culture springs a common framework 
for those in uniform and common expectations regarding standards of 
behavior, discipline, teamwork, loyalty, selfless duty, and the customs that 
support these elements.102    
 
A distinctive strong culture is vital to the building of cohesion and esprit de corps, and is 
the bedrock of military effectiveness and success in battle.103  
What are the Corps’ values and how do they compare with those of civilian 
society?  The Marine Corps Values Program Order has this to say: 
The world and society have changed significantly over the past two 
decades, and we as an institution must join the battle with America’s 
families, churches, and schools to help instill fundamental values in 
today’s youth….Our goal is to continue to produce Marines who are 
exemplary citizens and who will act honorably and intelligently, whatever 
their situation or level of responsibilities.  All Marines are expected to 
epitomize that which is good about our Nation and to personify the ideals 
upon which it was founded.  Honor, Courage, and Commitment are not 
just words; they frame the way Marines are to live and act.104  
  
The core values of honor, courage, and commitment are at the heart of Marine Corps 
culture, and in a time of what some describe as “moral relativism,” they may seem out of 
date.105  In discussing these core values and the comments of Lister, Toner writes: “The 
notion that the Corps, in its belief that Marines should have such virtues, is somehow 
‘extremist’ is not only unfair but petty.  And the honorable former assistant secretary is 
thus both wrong and wrong-headed.”106 
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In contrast to Marine Corps culture, it is becoming increasingly difficult to define 
American civilian culture.  Today, many social trends are seen as contributing to what 
some describe as social “decay” in America and a rejection of traditional moral 
standards.107  However civilian culture may be defined, it is clear that differences do 
exist between the Marine Corps and civilian society.  In explaining, “Why the Gap 
Matters,” Cohen writes: 
Military officers, researchers found, doubt that the civilian world values 
the same things they do, and perhaps they have a point.  The requirements 
of self-sacrifice, discipline, loyalty, and altruism demanded by military 
service cannot be squared with a society that, though brimming with 
energy, celebrates the opposite values of acquisition, individuality, career 
and geographic mobility, and self-actualization.108 
 
The differences between the professional military and civilian society are not 
new.  Evidence can be found that the values of the professional military and those of 
civilian society have always been at odds since the founding of our nation.109  For 
example, Huntington and others have shown that the military has a history of being an 
estranged minority within America’s liberal society during times of peace.  According to 
Clotfelter, the typical American attitude toward the peacetime military is reflected by a 
contemporary of Thomas Jefferson who said: “I never want to see the face of [a military 
man] in our cities and intermixed with the people.”110  History has shown that 
Americans, although patriotic, prefer to think of themselves as peace-loving people and 
unless embarked on a crusade, tend to become apathetic about their military.111    In 
looking at the 1920s and 1930s, Samuel Huntington found the army at odds with 
civilians, as army officers found “military and civilian ethics fundamentally 
incompatible.”112  At the time, an Army officer remarked: “The soldier and the civilian 
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belong to separate classes of society.  The code of the soldier can never be the same as 
that of the civilian, why try to mingle them?”113  Clotfelter offers another comment 
reflecting the distance that develops between civilians and the military.  He cites a Navy 
officer of the 1920s who found that his uniform was often “mistaken for that of a railroad 
gateman, a bus conductor, or a messenger boy.”114  The peacetime period between the 
world wars is very similar to today.  Huntington asserts that, during the 1920s and 1930s, 
civilian morals were perceived as in decay, there was “too much hedonism, too little 
idealism and religion,” and the military felt alienated and under attack by liberal scholars, 
writers, and philosophers.115  Post-World War II isolation of the military is reflected in T. 
R. Fehrenbach’s description of America’s problems in the Korean War, when he writes:  
“Perhaps the values that comprise a decent civilization and those needed to defend it 
abroad will always be at odds.”116   
In contrast to Ricks' anecdotal experience with Marines’ “disdain” for civilians, a 
survey conducted in 2000 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found the 
military had a mostly positive attitude toward civilian society.  Eighty-eight percent of 
military personnel in the survey support socializing with civilians, 75 percent believed 
the military had a great deal of respect for civilians, and 80 percent felt their hometown 
had a high regard for the military.117   
 
3.  Why a Different Culture? 
As previously observed, the Marine Corps is in many ways unique among 
America’s armed forces.  It has the strongest service culture, partly because its very 
culture is what makes the Marines so singular, and partly because of its small size.  Ricks 
writes: “The Marines are distinct even within the separate world of the U.S. military.  
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Theirs is a culture apart….Culture—that is, the values and assumptions that shape its 
members—is all the Marines have.”118  Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak adds: 
In the American military establishment they were perennially the smallest 
kid on the block in a hostile neighborhood…they evolved an elite, almost 
mystical institutional personality.  Partaking variously of pride, 
aggressiveness, dedication, loyalty, discipline, and courage, this complex 
personality was—and is—dominated by a conviction that battle is the 
Marines’ only reason for existence and that they must be ready to respond 
promptly and effectively whenever given an opportunity to fight.  Finally, 
they came to accept, as an article of faith, that marines must not only be 
better than everyone else but different as well.119   
 
It is this dedication to warfighting that defines the Marine Corps culture and is the 
foundation of what Marines believe and value.120   
Understanding how the Marine Corps instills its culture into its recruits may help 
to explain what Ricks saw when he followed new Marines into the civilian world.  The 
Marine Corps is known for having tough recruit training and maintaining high 
standards.121  Military training, as Richard Holmes explains functions “to inculcate the 
military ethos in recruits, and to ensure the individual values which prevail in most 
civilian societies are replaced by the group spirit and group loyalties which underlie all 
military organizations.”122  Lieutenant General Krulak writes: “Young adults from 
diverse areas of the country and backgrounds are immersed in an environment wherein 
they are able to perceive, understand, and finally accept as dogma the essential Marine 
Corps virtues.”123  Krulak notes that, through shared hardship and deprivation, the recruit 
depots, officer candidate school, and the basic school, impress upon Marines and their 
officers with the fact that they belong to a corps apart and the finest fighting force in the 
world.  Trainees are taught its history of valor, its traditions, and its customs.  They are 
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taught that, on becoming Marines, they will have entered an exclusive fraternity of 
warriors.124  As a Marine Corps publication says: “We take America’s young men and 
women and imbue in them our ethos, our core values….We transform them into Marines.  
This transformation process lasts forever.”125   
Articles in the Marine Corps Gazette may explain why Marines are so protective 
of their warrior culture and seek to maintain the cultural gap.  According to Huntington, 
the U.S. military has historically felt pressured to be more like civilian culture.  
According to Huntington, liberal American society believes that “if armed forces must be 
maintained, they should be utilized to further other socially desirable objectives.”126  And 
Fehrenbach observes:  
Liberal society, in its heart, wants not only dominance of the military, but 
acquiescence of the military towards its liberal way of life.  Dominance 
and control society should have but acquiescence society may not have, if 
it wants an army worth a damn.  By the very nature of its mission, the 
military must maintain a hard and illiberal view of life and the world.  
Society’s purpose is to live; the military’s is to stand ready, if need be, to 
die.127 
 
This conflict in objectives is evident in a number of articles and letters from the 
Marine Corps Gazette during the 1990s.  Many emphasized the need for the Marine 
Corps to retain its warrior culture and to resist civilian efforts at “political correctness” 
and cultural change for the sake of social experimentation.  Examples of these articles 
include:  
• “Cultural (R)Evolution” 
• “ID’ing Our Cultural Centers of Gravity” 
• “Managing Military Mindsets” 
• “A Cultural Dilemma” 
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In “Cultural (R)Evolution,” Berens criticizes social engineering, political 
correctness, and feminization of the military as “fads of a softened society.”128  In 
“ID’ing Our Cultural Centers of Gravity,” Shelton writes that there are aspects of Marine 
culture to be defended, citing the concept that Marines are Marines twenty-four hours a 
day and prohibited from the “pernicious” quality of life initiatives that allow members of 
other services to wear earrings off-duty.  Shelton believes it is the culture that reinforces 
“the values and norms that make us Marines.”129  The Marine Corps Gazette editorial, 
“Managing Military Mindsets,” bemoans the adverse impact of the current “social 
engineering” and emphasizes the importance of the warrior ethos.130  And in “A Cultural 
Dilemma,” Nemeth writes that political correctness and bureaucracy have won over 
warrior culture and that “the Marine Corps has been through extensive and quite frankly, 
disheartening cultural changes….To placate those that advocate a politically correct, 
kinder, and gentler military is not only unfortunate, but also frightening.”131   
Marines were asked by the Marine Corps Gazette to offer their opinions of the 
civil-military gap as a “hot button” issue.  One Marine thought it was nothing new and 
could be handled by good leadership.  Another felt the “gap” argument is flawed, since 
the United States does not have a homogeneous culture to compare with the Marine 
Corps.  Instead, he argues that the Marines’ culture is just the distilled values of the silent 
majority of Americans and that it is the liberals in the government and media who 
perpetuate the values divide for their own ends.  At the same time, a Marine major 
contends that “the real danger is the purpose to which academia and political activists 
will use the perceived civilian-military cultural gap.”132     
An enlightening article was one by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, written 
in response to an officer’s e-mail.  A first lieutenant sent an e-mail to then-Commandant, 
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General Krulak, stating his desire to get out of the Marine Corps because, “unfortunately, 
our Corps has been overrun by those attempting to make the Corps a reflection of our 
society as regards to race, gender, etc.  We have lost our focus as warfighters.”  General 
Krulak responded that, not only had the Corps maintained its standards relative to those 
of the other services, but it had actually raised them by elevating recruiting standards, 
making boot camp longer, and raising the physical fitness test requirements for women, 
among other initiatives.  General Krulak writes:  
And if you think we haven’t had to fight to do all of this—higher 
standards, longer training, the Crucible, gender-segregated—then you are 
really missing the boat….We are holding the standard, holding the line.  
While all the other Services are caving in to what is politically correct, 
your Corps is standing tall and firm!133   
 
4.  How the Gap Affects the Military Vote 
Because Marines believe fervently in the importance of their warrior culture, 
politicians or interest groups who criticize Marine culture actually influence Marine 
officers’ voting behavior.  Hillen and Owens contend that the goal of some Democrats, 
such as Representative Patricia Schroeder, has been to destroy military culture.  This was 
supposedly indicated when she “gleefully announced during the Navy’s Tailhook travails 
that the Service’s problems represented ‘the sound of a culture cracking.’”134  Perhaps, in 
the minds of Marines, “liberal Democrats” were the perpetrators of the political 
correctness they so fear.  As Donnelly writes:  “The Clinton years have confirmed the 
irredeemable dislike of Democrats for the military, with the battle turning…to a clash of 
cultures.”135  When given the opportunity to express their opinion at the ballot box, 
Marines may then vote for candidates who do not pose a threat to maintaining the Marine 
culture.  Over forty years ago, Janowitz wrote:  “The simple-minded marine colonel who 
boasts that his profession is to kill is an anachronism.”136  While Marines may still be 
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anachronisms, their “simple-minded,” or perhaps more accurately, single-minded, 
devotion to war continues to shape their culture and opinions. 
 
C.  PRESIDENT CLINTON AND MARINE OFFICERS’ VOTES  
The presidency is not merely an administrative office.  That is the least 
part of it.  It is preeminently a place of moral leadership.              
Franklin Delano Roosevelt137 
 
1. President Clinton Versus the Military 
From the beginning of his administration, President Clinton had a troublesome 
relationship with the military.  From his seeming avoidance of service during the 
Vietnam War, to his campaign promise to lift the military’s ban on homosexuals, seeds of 
mistrust were planted in the military even before he took office.138  Furthermore, 
President Clinton’s eight years in office were marked by continued poor relations with 
the military.  The characteristic trend of the Clinton years, at least in the minds of many 
military members, was increased military deployments in the face of shrinking defense 
resources.139  In addition, his time in office was marked by what a number of military 
officers considered an assault on their warrior culture.140  And although his presidency 
survived the Monica Lewinsky scandal, military officers’ opinions of the president’s 
leadership skills and character suffered.141  In private, military officers may have asked, 
“Why isn’t he, as Commander-in-Chief, being held to the same standard applied to us?”  
During the 2000 presidential campaign, Democrats claimed the military was stronger 
than ever, while Republicans cited declining readiness and morale.142  Clinton’s 
presidency may have affected Marine officers’ voting behavior in two ways during the 
election of 2000.  First, Marines may have been concerned with the effect his presidency 
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had on warfighting effectiveness.  Second, Marines may have been concerned with 
President Clinton’s leadership and character.  It is easy to see how the combination of 
these two concerns would then have reflected on the candidacy of Al Gore and the 
Democratic Party that he led. 
 
2.  President Clinton and Warfighting Effectiveness  
The first major issue raised by Bill Clinton was lifting the ban on gays in the 
military.  Korb writes in “The Military and Social Change” that, despite opposition from 
the military, Clinton was rewarded for responding to interest groups such as homosexuals 
during his election campaign.  According to Korb, it was estimated that gays and lesbians 
raised four-million dollars for Clinton’s campaign in 1992 and that one out of seven votes 
for Clinton was cast by a homosexual.143  Korb asserts that the military uses “extremist 
logic” to resist change when its members predict dire consequences for military 
effectiveness.  And, as Korb contends, despite the military’s protests, it is correct to force 
social change on the armed forces because “civilians must continue to insure the military 
reflects the social norms of the society it defends.”144  This issue so disturbed senior 
military leaders, however, that resistance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff eventually 
contributed to Clinton’s inability to lift the ban.145 
Another example of Marines’ frustration during the Clinton administration 
centered on the issue of women in combat, which sparked considerable debate in the 
pages of the Marine Corps Gazette.  In letters, “Regarding Women in Combat,” Marines 
expressed their concerns.  A retired colonel writes: “The issue involves principles beyond 
justice and equal opportunity.  The requirement for military effectiveness and an 
understanding of the primary reason for which the Nation’s Armed Forces exist are the 
overriding considerations.” A major writes that the removal of restrictions on women into 
combat were “sad indications as to just how successfully entrenched feminists have 
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become in our political and military institutions.  Sound judgment has taken a back seat 
to their social agendas.”  Another colonel writes:  
This issue will never be resolved politically.  There is too much at stake 
for both the supporters, whose interest are not combat related, and for the 
detractors, who have too much to lose on the battlefield.…Political 
correctness will be the American Gallipoli if not confined to the beltway.   
 
And a retired master sergeant observed: “Frustrations arise in men when politicians 
attempt to force the military to employ women as surrogate men in roles that they are not 
as well suited for.”146 
Marines are probably typical of voters in any profession.  As Segal points out, 
they will pursue their corporate interests in the political arena just like any other voter 
making a choice.147  Professional soldiers are not greatly compensated monetarily, a 
contrast that became especially evident during the “new” booming economy of the 
1990s.148  Instead, they rely largely on their own self-esteem and pride in service.  
Nordlinger asserts that, although civilian control is internalized in professional soldiers, 
civilian leaders must have “due regard for the military.”  Government must respect the 
military’s honor, expertise, autonomy, and political neutrality.  Nordlinger goes on to 
claim the government should not slur its officers, interfere in professional military affairs, 
or use the military for domestic political advantage.149  Huntington adds:  “The statesman 
must recognize the integrity of the professional and its subject matter.”150  Janowitz also 
observes that because military officers are deprived of wealth, their self-identity becomes 
more important.  When politicians deny or destroy military officers’ self-esteem, then it 
increases tensions between civilians and the military.151   
 
 
                                                 
146 “Regarding Women in Combat,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1998, 29-30. 
147 Segal, 191. 
148 Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff, 13. 
149 Nordlinger, 13. 
150 Huntington, 72. 
151 Janowitz, 248. 
32 
3.  President Clinton’s Leadership and Character 
The second aspect of the Clinton presidency that relates to Marines’ opinions was 
a prevalent view regarding his moral character.  President Clinton’s reputed extra-marital 
affairs and impeachment might have had a great impact on how Marines viewed his 
character and ability to serve as Commander-in-Chief.  Leadership is a fundamental part 
of the warrior culture, especially among Marine officers.  The Marine Corps order on 
leadership training states:  
The primary goal of Marine Corps leadership is to instill in all Marines the 
fact that they are warriors first.  The only reason the United States of 
America needs a Marine Corps is to fight and win wars.  Everything else 
is secondary.  
  
Its purpose is also to foster application of leadership principles, in particular leadership 
by example, and to develop, “proper moral and ethical behavior.”152   
In Choosing Presidents, Novak sees the American president as symbolizing a 
king, high priest, and prophet.  And he believes Americans react with passion as to what 
the president represents.  According to Novak, the symbolic power of the president is real 
and the “way he lives affects our image of ourselves.”153  What President Clinton did 
during his time in office symbolized different things to different people, and Marines’ 
perceptions of what he “stood for” were sure to affect their opinions.  Kohn writes that 
Bill Clinton was a president “with less experience, interest, understanding, and credibility 
in military affairs than any since the 1920s.”  And that his presidency had soured civil-
military relations to the point where no commander-in-chief had ever been “so disliked or 
so reviled, or spoken of with such contempt and dislike by the professional military.”154  
As Stone also observes:  
For eight years, many in the military have felt discomfort when saluting 
their commander in chief.  They regard President Clinton as a draft dodger 
whose moral authority has been lacking on everything from his push to let 
gays serve openly in the military to his affair with Monica Lewinsky.155 
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Eitelberg and Little show that Clinton’s troubled relationship with the military 
became a focus of attention by the news media.156  As the first of the “baby boomers” to 
be elected President, President Clinton was viewed with suspicion by the military 
establishment and linked to a decades-old remark that he was “sympathetic toward those 
who ‘loved their country but loathed the military.’”  As it turned out, his early first-term 
staff contained almost no veterans.  In fact, the press reported a  “prevalent view that Mr. 
Clinton and his staff neither understand military life nor like military people.”157   
Several unfortunate incidents between the White House staff and military members 
appeared to demonstrate in the least, an insensitivity or lack of understanding regarding 
the military.158 
Two Marine officers published articles criticizing President Clinton and his 
character.  One referred to President Clinton as a “known criminal,” a “morally defective 
leader,” “a lying draft dodger,” “hypocrite-in-chief,” and “perhaps the most selfish man 
ever to disgrace our presidency.”159  These articles highlight how President Clinton’s 
misbehavior might have affected Marine officers.  Captain Bracknell’s Marine Corps 
Gazette article on these incidents explains why the two officers were wrong to publicly 
rebuke the president but also what motivated them to do so: 
It is true that Marines like to speak out.  We sometimes see our core values 
of Honor, Courage, and Commitment as requirements to take on the 
establishment in the name of righteousness and morality.  We like to fix 
what we perceive as wrong.  In the arena of politics, however, Marine 
officers must suppress that urge because the law and our tradition as 
professional warriors so command.  Our core values demand that we 
remain publicly indifferent to the political fray so that America and her 
elected head of state harbor no doubts of our loyalty.160   
 
This article did provoke responses from other officers, however, that rejected 
complete silence by Marines regarding President Clinton’s leadership.  One believed 
Marines needed to have moral courage and stand up for what was right, citing the                                                  
156 Eitelberg and Little, 50. 
157 Ibid., 49. 
158 Eitelberg and Little, 49. 
159 Bracknell, 106. 
160 Ibid., 105. 
34 
German army’s failure to stop Hitler.  As this officer observed, loyalty to the president 
“shouldn’t be unconditional loyalty where inappropriate conduct can’t be criticized.”  
Another officer wrote that, if his commanding officer had done something bad, he would 
offer honest, respectful criticism, because  
we are United States Marines, not Ceasar’s (sic) Praetorian Guards, and 
our unconditional loyalty should never lie with any one man or group of 
men, especially when their moral behavior is in question.  Our 
unconditional loyalty must be to our country, our Constitution, and the 
American people we serve.161   
 
Why would President Clinton’s misadventures provoke such emotional responses from 
Marine officers?  As Novak writes:  
The president of the United States is one of the great symbolic powers 
known to history.  His actions seep irrepressibly into our hearts.  He 
dwells in us.  That is why we wrestle against him, rise up in hatred often, 
wish to retch.162 
 
Marine Corps officers are taught to be leaders, including morally and physically.  
Excerpts from a Marine leadership publication illuminate where Marine officers derive 
their beliefs and help to explain their opinions of President Clinton’s behavior.  Honor, 
courage, and commitment, the Marines’ core values, constitute the basis of their 
leadership concepts.  According to the order, “a leader who lies—or even slightly distorts 
the truth…is being dishonorable and unethical.”163  Leadership traits and principles 
include:  integrity, judgment, setting the example, and seeking responsibility and taking 
responsibility for one’s actions.164  Another enlightening passage says, “Marine Corps 
leadership includes inspirational personal example of high moral standards reflecting 
virtue, honor, moral responsibility, personal adherence to high standards of conduct and 
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the guidance of subordinates towards wholesomeness of mind and body.”165  These are 
the standards Marine officers have set for themselves.  Should they apply to the 
President? 
Although the President is the Commander-in-Chief, he is still a civilian and not 
subject to the strict laws of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, where adultery and 
sodomy are still punishable offenses.  In the wake of such recent events as the Kelly 
Flinn controversy and the Aberdeen scandal, military officers testified that this “double 
standard” of acceptable behavior was hurting morale.166  The majority of Americans, 
however, seemed to be able to separate President Clinton’s private mistakes from his 
performance as President, since his approval rating still remained above seventy percent 
in 1999.167  Sarkesian and Connor note that, in this sense, it is a conflict of values and 
goes back to the differences in military and civilian culture.  Sarkesian and Connor write: 
“For most in the military profession, performance in an official capacity is inseparable 
from the ‘whole’ man or woman, encompassing character, conduct, honor, trust, and 
loyalty.” 168   And that while publicly silent, some military leaders acknowledged 
“privately…that the president’s adulterous affairs and misleading statements may cause a 
devastating and irrecoverable erosion in his standing among service members and further 
damage sagging morale in the ranks.”169  Sarkesian and Connor further observe: “It is 
also clear that the commander-in-chief is a critical reference point for the military; he/she 
must epitomize the character and conduct expected of military professionals.  One cannot 
expect less from those who send military men and women into harm’s way.”170  
Although speaking about a different topic, General Krulak’s remarks at a conference 
regarding women in the military are relevant.  According to General Krulak:  
There is no room for so-called ‘situational’ ethics in the profession of 
arms.  That is why we have drawn a clear line between acceptable and 
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unacceptable conduct.  Policies on adultery and fraternization must be 
clear and consistently enforced.  Double standards cannot be tolerated.171 
 
After the 2000 election, military personnel felt free to offer comments about 
President Clinton and their feelings became more evident.    For example, when President 
George W. Bush visited military bases during his early weeks in office, one Marine 
commented about President Clinton: “You don’t necessarily have to be in the Marines to 
be a good commander in chief, but it helps if you don’t hate our guts.”  Another Marine 
went on to say: “I was just so sick and tired of the way Clinton treated the military.”172 
These remarks suggest that President Clinton left a largely negative impression on the 
military, whether justified or not. 
 
D.  EFFECT OF PEER PRESSURE 
…Apart from monastic orders there is no comparable social body that so 
sets its stamp, for so much of a man’s life, on every individual belonging 
to it.                  
Be’eri173 
 
Why would such a large majority of military officers vote for the same candidate 
and favor the same party?  Besides some of the possible reasons cited above, officers 
might be influenced by peer pressure or socialization.   
 
1.  Social Group Voting Behavior 
Research on voting behavior has shown that people in the same social groups and 
of the same socioeconomic backgrounds tend to vote the similarly.  As Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, and Gaudet write: “Voting is essentially a group experience.  People who work 
or live or play together are likely to vote for the same candidates.”174  They go on to note 
that “people who live together under similar external conditions are likely to develop 
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similar needs and interests.  They tend to see the world through the same colored glasses; 
they tend to apply to common experiences common interpretations.”175  Marine officers 
obviously belong to a tight-knit, cohesive social group.  They also tend to come from 
conservative or military families, and certain regions of the country that are more 
Republican.176  In this sense, the majority of officers preferring the Republican Party 
could result from self-selection of Republicans based on demographic factors and a desire 
to belong to the same social group, that is, the military. 
 
2.  Peer Pressure 
In addition, there could also be peer pressure to conform to cultural norms.  
Nordlinger believes that, in the military, 
political attitudes are then maintained and further strengthened by 
conformist pressure—pressures that are more forcefully felt than in almost 
any other political group.  For the military comes close to being a ‘total 
institution’:  officers work and live within its confines, military life is 
sharply differentiated from civilian life, officers are often segregated and 
occasionally isolated from civilians, and they remain within the same 
institution throughout their careers. 
 
Nordlinger also asserts that the fusion of personal and military life to foster 
cohesion and  “brotherhood” makes it very difficult for deviant officers to challenge 
prevailing norms in political beliefs.177  Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet also found that 
“during the campaign social groups imbue their individual members with the accepted 
political ideology of the group.”178  The authors assert that people will adjust their voting 
intentions to conform with their group and that, “people vote, not only with their social 
group, but also for it.”  And that some people may “acquiesce to the political temper of 
their group under the steady, personal influence of their more politically active fellow 
citizens.”179  Although law prohibits political indoctrination in the military, informal 
social pressures may obviously come to bear.  There is evidence that military voters tend 
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to believe that their comrades vote for the same candidate as they do.  For example, in 
talking to soldiers about absentee ballots in Florida, Eckenrode found that “when the final 
votes come in, they said they expect their overseas counterparts to have voted the same 
way they did.”180 
 
E.  WHAT WERE OFFICERS’ OPINIONS OF THE CANDIDATES? 
 
The election of a president is an almost religious task; it intimately affects 
the life of the spirit, our identity.  Who the man is determines in real 
measure who we are.                     
Michael Novak181 
 
Ultimately, the presidential election of 2000 was a contest between Texas 
Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore.  What was the impression these 
candidates made on people in the military and why?   
A sample of articles written before and after the election reflects how people in 
the military might have felt about the candidates: 
•  “Teamsters back Gore; Bush gets a military boost,” The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, September 8, 2000. 
• “Military Backs Ex-Guard Pilot Over Pvt. Gore,” The New York Times, 
September 21, 2000. 
• “Military Vote in Florida Could Cement Bush Victory,” 
www.newsmax.com, November 9, 2000. 
• “Military voters support Bush,” www.augustachronicle.com, November 
11, 2000. 
•  “Why Soldiers Dislike Democrats,” www.weeklystandard.com, 
December 4, 2000. 
• “Bush gets cheers in the barracks,” USA Today, January 8, 2001. 
 
1.  A Battle of “Hawks”  
Although Gore and Bush differed in many respects, the presidential race was “a 
battle of hawks when it comes to defense.”182   Comparing the candidates’ platforms 
                                                 
180 Vicky Eckenrode, “Military voters support Bush,” The Augusta Chronicle, 11 November 2000, 3. 
181 Novak, 4. 
182 “A Case for the Defense: Gore, Bush Both Hawks on Security Matters,” www.abcnews.com, 1. 
39 
showed that Gore was traditionally a pro-defense democrat, one of only ten democratic 
senators to vote in favor of the Gulf War, a proponent of missile defense, and promised 
100 billion dollars for defense during the campaign.  Bush on the other hand was also a 
proponent of missile defense and promised 47 billion dollars for defense.183 Since both 
candidates advocated a strong defense, the major issue during the campaign became the 
state of the nation’s military under the Clinton-Gore administration.   Accordingly:  
“Bush…sought to make an issue out of the country’s military preparedness, saying the 
Clinton administration has hurt troop morale and neglected to keep the armed forces in 
top shape.”184  Bush was supported in these claims by former generals Schwarzkopf and 
Powell who, serving under Bush’s father, had orchestrated the U.S. victory in the Gulf 
War.  Gore vigorously disputed Bush’s claims, citing a 4.8 percent military pay increase 
enacted under the Clinton-Gore administration.185 
Bush claimed the Clinton-Gore team had presided over a “military in decline.”186  
According to Newman, Bush’s claims were bolstered by a study that indicated people in 
the military were frustrated by shortages of spare parts and equipment.187  Gore pointed 
to Clinton’s approval of a 112 billion dollar increase in defense spending and claimed 
America’s armed force “is the strongest and the best in the entire world.”188  Newman 
writes:  
Undeniably so.  But the US military’s vast menu of missions makes 
comparisons with any other single force oversimplistic.  No other military 
is required to be ready to fight and win two separate wars while 
conducting indefinite missions in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, relief 
operations wherever they pop up, and exercises with numerous other 
nations.189   
 
                                                 
183 Ibid., 1.  
184 “A Case for the Defense,” 2. 
185 Ibid., 2. 
186 Richard J. Newman, “Paying atten-shun to military’s needs,” U.S. News & World Report, 4 
September 2000. 




A poll of nearly 76,000 people taken by Vote.com asked who was right about the state of 
the military.  Ninety-two percent of the respondents felt Bush was right saying “the next 
president would inherit a military in decline,” while only eight percent felt the Clinton-
Gore administration was correct in saying, “we’ve got the finest fighting force in 
history.”190  Bush also had the support of retired general Colin Powell who said: “The 
ones who are attacking the military are those who pretend that everything is OK…it’s 
time to face reality.”191  At the same time, Hutcheson and Thomma found that 
“Independent military experts say reality falls somewhere between the candidates’ 
contrasting views.”192 
 
2.  Al Gore 
President Clinton’s legacy to Al Gore may have been poor relations with our 
nation’s military.  Despite Al Gore’s strong record of support for the military, the 
seeming assaults on the military’s culture that took place during President Clinton’s 
terms, coupled with the strongly negative opinions of many officers concerning President 
Clinton’s character and leadership, may have left a lasting impression on how military 
members perceived Al Gore.  In many ways, candidate Gore’s identity was linked with 
that of President Clinton, whom he had served loyally as Vice President through two 
terms. 
Myers writes: “Al Gore enlisted in the Army and went to Vietnam.  George W. 
Bush joined the Texas National Guard and did not.  But for many people in uniform, that 
makes little difference.”  Myers feels soldiers gave Bush the benefit of the doubt for not 
serving in Vietnam while only giving grudging respect to Gore, one saying that Gore was 
only “a public affairs puke.”193  Myers adds: “It was clear that Mr. Gore—despite his 
own record, his service on the Senate’s Armed Services Committee and his relatively 
more hawkish views on defense issues compared with other Democrats—suffered from 
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his association with Mr. Clinton.”194 Meanwhile, many military officers were concerned 
that readiness problems had grown during Gore’s watch, that Gore would expand the role 
of women in the military, and were alarmed by his support of gays serving openly.195  
Despite these negative opinions, some felt that Gore had greater credibility on defense 
issues and understanding of military life and would have an excellent rapport with the 
military.196  Myers quotes Retired General Charles Krulak, a Bush supporter, as agreeing, 
and said people in the military would “just be happy to have somebody who knows how 
to salute.”197 
As previously noted, officers’ opinions of Gore were affected by his vow to let 
homosexuals serve openly in the military.  During a presidential campaign debate, Peter 
Jennings asked Al Gore if he would make an agreement on gays in the military a "litmus 
test" for appointments to the joint chiefs. Gore responded, "Yes."  But Gore’s remark 
“angered many current and retired military officers, who charged political interference in 
the armed forces.”  Vice President Gore later retracted the statement saying:  “I did not 
mean to imply that there should ever be any kind of inquiry into the personal political 
opinions of officers in the U.S. military….What I meant to convey was I would not 
tolerate…orders not being followed.”198  Nevertheless Senator John McCain expressed 
the views of many in the defense establishment when he remarked: “…any potential 
president who says he will choose members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ‘to pursue a social 
agenda’ does not qualify for the job.”199  Retired General Charles Krulak felt such a 
“test” would discourage officers from seeking the top post, saying: “Knowing people 
who have held the position before and some who serve now, there are some who would 
take themselves out of the running rather than submit to such a litmus test.”200 
Feaver is quoted as saying that Gore already  
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brought an undue amount of civil-military baggage to the White 
House…His campaign missteps, such as the careless promise to use 
attitudes toward homosexuality…in choosing the Joint Chiefs; his 
association with, and defense of, Bill Clinton, a commander-in-chief for 
whom many service members feel contempt; and his embrace of 
unpopular nation-building missions—all of these have grated on those in 
uniform.201 
 
3.  George W. Bush 
In contrast, Myers found that “It is Mr. Bush, not Mr. Gore, who seems to enjoy 
some automatic credibility with the military because of his party affiliation, his policy 
positions, his running mate, his advisers—and his father.”  Myers asserts that Gore had 
far less support among military officers than did his opponent, Bush.  One of the reasons 
for Bush’s appeal was his father, former President George Bush, “who…served ably as 
commander in chief during the military’s shining moment after Vietnam, the Persian Gulf 
War.”  Myers found people in the military preferred Bush’s policy proposals, agreed with 
Bush’s assessment that Clinton-Gore oversaw a “military in decline,” and liked Bush’s 
advisers, which included former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and retired General 
Colin Powell.  Myers quotes an Army colonel as saying, “People are just more 
comfortable with the idea of a Bush-Cheney-Powell team in the White House again.”202  
People in the military cheered Bush’s campaign promises to reduce “open ended” 
overseas missions, which contrasted with Gore’s endorsement of President Clinton’s 
strategy and support for even more humanitarian missions.203  As one retired Army 
officer observed:  “One of the biggest points in Bush’s favor is that he’s not Gore.”204  
Similarly, a military voter who supported Bush stated, “We’ve always tried to be 
nonpolitical…,” but “…have become more active in the political process largely due to 
the Clinton administration’s policies and attitudes toward the armed forces.”  He believed 
the military had been “grossly run down” by the Clinton administration.205 Another 
article agreed that, despite Gore’s promise of greater defense spending, “officers planning 
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to vote Republican asserted their votes were swayed more by Bush’s presumed national 
security team.”206  And, that “many in the military feel strongly that the Clinton-Gore 
administration has weakened America’s defense.  Now it might be payback time.”207 
 
F.  SUMMARY 
Considerable evidence suggests that Marine officers’ strongly supported George 
W. Bush during the 2000 presidential election.  Five aspects of this behavior are 
discussed in the literature:  the effect of political party affiliation on the military vote; the 
effect of military ethos; the effect of the Clinton presidency; the effect of peer pressure 
and group behavior; and officers’ opinions of the presidential candidates.     
First, evidence suggests that those in the military have an affinity for the 
Republican Party.  Contrasting opinions can be found on whether military members 
should be considered a partisan interest group or apolitical professionals.  Research so far 
indicates that soldiers are politically conservative, but not to an extreme.  The Republican 
Party is attractive to officers because they share similar values and opinions.  Marine 
officers, however, appear to believe in remaining non-partisan in their professional 
conduct.   
Second, a cultural gap exists between the Marine Corps and civilian society.  The 
cultural conflict may have turned Marines against the Democrats, but the gap may exist 
for reasons of military effectiveness, not elitism or disdain.   
Third, Marine officers’ beliefs concerning the importance of moral leadership 
coupled with their service under President Clinton, may have cast a negative impression 
of the Democratic Party and Al Gore. 
Fourth, research on the voting behavior of social groups indicates a trend toward 
political homogeneity.  In addition, some believe the close cohesiveness and brotherhood 
of military life exerts conformist political pressure on officers. 
Finally, it appears that officers preferred George W. Bush over Al Gore.  Primary 
reasons cited in favor of Bush were his party, his policies, his advisers, and his father.                                                   
206 “Military Vote in Florida Could Cement Bush Victory,” www.newsmax.com, 2. 
207 Ibid., 2. 
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Primary reasons cited against Gore were his support of Clinton administration positions 
and his promise to remove restrictions on gays in the military. 
Several questions related to these topics remain unanswered.  Just how important 
was party affiliation to Marine officers’ votes?  What part did Marine Corps’ core values 
play in their choice of candidate?  How did serving under President Clinton influence 
Marines’ voting decision?  What part did social peer pressure play in their vote?  And, 
who did Marine officers think was the better candidate, and why?  The ultimate goal of 
this study is to determine if the majority of Marine officers did indeed favor Bush.  If so, 
it is important to know why Marine officers voted for Bush, since the political attitudes of 














This chapter provides details on how the voting behavior of Marine Corps officers 
was studied.  A survey was used to explore the opinions of Marine officers regarding 
election 2000.  The survey and sample population are described along with a summary of 
the approach for data analysis. 
 
A. SURVEY 
A thirty-nine question survey was used to examine the voting behavior of Marine 
Corps officers who were enrolled at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, 
California in August 2001.208  To prevent violation of Department of Defense directives 
against the “polling” of service members about their votes, the survey was strictly 
voluntary, and anonymity was maintained.209  The following demographic information 
was collected from respondents as they were considered possible factors affecting voting 
and political behavior:  gender, race, military occupational community, commissioning 
source, and regional origin.   
The survey was designed to explore one primary question:  Did Marine officers 
vote for Al Gore or George W. Bush?  In addition, the survey sought information to 
answer five secondary research questions:    
1. What was the effect of political party affiliation? 
2. What were Marine officers opinions of the candidates? 
3. What was the effect of Marine Corps’ ethos? 
4. What was the effect of the Clinton administration? 
5. What was the effect of peer pressure? 
Many people have assumed that the majority of service members voted for Bush.  
As previously noted, a Defense Department directive prohibits the polling of service 
members regarding their vote.  This is most likely intended partly to prevent the military 
from becoming entangled in just the kind of partisan battles that occurred in Florida after 
election 2000.  Instead of asking about their vote, respondents were asked who did they 
“prefer” in the election.  Responses were scaled to explore the intensity of officers’ 
                                                 
208 The survey is presented in Appendix A. 
209 Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 dated 15 June 1990, prohibits the “polling” of service 
members regarding their vote.  “Polling” being defined as requiring a response. 
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preference and they were also given the option of choosing “Other” if they preferred a 
third party candidate or none at all.   
One of the main concerns regarding service members and election 2000 was 
political party partisanship.  Questions were asked to explore the intensity of political 
party affiliation.  In particular, questions were asked to determine party membership, 
participation in party activities, financial contributions, and the number of years affiliated 
with their party.  In addition, the respondents were also asked which party platforms they 
preferred.  Lastly, the respondents were asked whether they considered issues or party 
more important. 
Next, respondents were asked what they thought of the candidates.  Respondents 
were asked which candidate’s domestic, foreign, and defense policies they preferred; 
which candidate’s character and personality they preferred; and, because it may have 
been important to service members, which candidate had the better military record.  
Respondents were then asked to rank the various candidate factors in order of 
importance.  For questions about candidates, respondents were limited to expressing 
preferences for Gore or Bush, as they were considered the most significant candidates.   
To explore the effect of Marine Corps culture on officers’ votes, respondents were 
asked which candidate they thought better reflected Marine “core” values and would 
better support a “warfighting” ethos. 
As discussed in Chapter II, officers’ views regarding the Clinton administration 
may have affected their political preferences in the 2000 election.  Respondents were 
asked how the Clinton presidency affected military readiness and culture; how it affected 
the country’s economy and morals; and if the Clinton administration had influenced them 
to vote for Gore or Bush.  Respondents were also questioned to explore anecdotal 
evidence that officers’ opinions of President Clinton had a negative influence on their 
opinions of Al Gore and, conversely, that their opinions of President Bush positively 
affected their opinions of his son, George W. Bush. 
To capture which factor had the most influence on their vote, respondents were 
also asked to rank the above factors in order of importance. 
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Finally, to explore the possible effect of peer pressure and social group on voting 
behavior, the respondents were asked several questions regarding how they felt their 
fellow officers had voted or which candidate most officers supported.  They were also 
asked if they had witnessed any negative reactions toward officers who deviated from the 
group norm. 
 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
A pre-test was conducted with a number of non-participants to ensure that the 
survey questions were clear and easily understood.  Military officers at NPS were not 
used for the pre-test since anonymity would not be maintained in accordance with the 
Defense Department directive.  The survey was found to be adequate and no changes 
were made before implementation. 
 
1.  Survey Distribution 
The survey was created and distributed online using SurveySaid software 
provided by the NPS Office of Strategic Planning, Educational Assessment and 
Institutional Research (SPEAR).210  The SPEAR office ensured the survey met Navy and 
federal requirements and then posted it to a special NPS web site.  Electronic mail 
requesting participation in the survey was then distributed to all Marine officers at NPS 
through the school’s Marine liaison office.   
The web site remained active for two weeks.  To increase the survey response 
rate, after one week, a second e-mail was distributed to remind officers of the cut-off 
date. 
 
2. Response Rate 
Marine officers at NPS were notified of the survey web site on August 15, 2001.  
At the time of notification, there were 209 Marine Corps officer students at NPS.  The 
SPEAR office recorded a total of 138 responses by August 29, 2001, resulting in a 
response rate of 66 percent.  Twenty-one officers provided additional comments (10 
percent of total respondents).                                                  
210 Barbara Honneger, “SPEAR Helps NPS Surveys Go Online,” Campus News, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 4 May 2001, 1.   http://www.surveysaid.com 
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3. Respondent Demographics 
As seen in Table 1, survey respondents are similar to the total population of 
officers in the Marine Corps with respect to racial/ethnic group and gender.  Twelve 
percent of the respondents indicated that they were a minority, compared with 15 percent 
of all Marine officers; 2 percent of respondents were women, compared with 5 percent of 
all Marine officers.  Although Marine Corps students at NPS are self-selected, this match 
indicates that the respondent population is fairly representative of the total USMC officer 
population. 
 
Table 1.   Racial/Ethnic Group and Gender of Respondents and Officers in U.S. 

























*USMC demographics compiled from Marines Magazine Almanac 2001, 46-47.  Warrant Officers are 
excluded because they do not attend NPS. 
 
4. Data Analysis 
Data were collated by the SPEAR office and analyzed using the SurveySaid 
Analyzer program.  Frequency analysis was done for each question.  At the same time, 
cross-tabulations were conducted with several questions to examine the effects of 
demographics and other factors.  
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IV. RESULTS 
This chapter discusses the results of the survey of Marine Corps NPS students 
regarding their voting behavior and decisions during election 2000.  Although the results 
of this study may not apply to the Marine Corps or the military officer populations as a 
whole, they can contribute to our understanding of this important aspect of civil-military 
relations.   
Much of the controversy surrounding election 2000 revolved around military 
absentee ballots.  It was assumed that the military voted overwhelmingly for Bush, only 
helping to confirm in the minds of some observers that the military had become a 
Republican “interest group.”  The survey results can help to shed light on whether this 
assumption is true.  The chapter focuses on factors that were explored in the literature 
review, namely officers’ opinions of the candidates, the effect of political party, the effect 
of Marine Corps ethos, the effect of the Clinton administration, and the effect of social 
group and peer pressure. 
 
A. AND THE WINNER IS? 
 
1.  For Whom Did Marine Officers Vote? 
Although the results of the popular vote across the nation were very close, Marine 
Corps officers in the survey sample overwhelmingly preferred George W. Bush.  As seen 
in Table 2, 84 percent preferred Bush, compared with 12 percent for Gore.  Among those 








Table 2.   Which Candidate Did Marine Corps Officers Prefer? 
 















8 4 4 23 61 
  
This dramatic difference in preference is interesting considering the national vote 
count.  As Page noted in his book, Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections, 
candidates are often forced to be ambiguous about their policies to pursue election-
winning middle votes.211  What could account for such a large split in candidate 
preference? 
 
2. Marine Officers’ Opinions of the Candidates 
The results of survey questions related to the candidates may help to explain this 
dramatic split.  As shown in Table 3, the majority of survey respondents had a weak or 
strong preference for Bush’s policies on domestic, foreign, and especially defense issues.  
Gore’s domestic policy was his most preferred area with 18 percent of officers indicating 
a weak or strong preference.  It is interesting to note here that 89 percent of respondents 






                                                 
211 Benjamin I. Page, Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral 
Democracy (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1978) , 270. 
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12. Which candidate’s domestic policy platform did 
you prefer? 
18 76 
13. Which candidate’s foreign policy platform did 
you prefer? 
11 82 




This disparity in defense policy preference is especially remarkable since Al Gore 
is generally regarded as having a strong military record, as a Vietnam veteran and as a 
pro-military senator.  An officer who supported Gore had this to add on his survey:  
“Gore served in Vietnam, Bush did not.  Bush went UA [Unauthorized Absence, Marine 
Corps equivalent of AWOL].  Gore did not.”  Another officer in the survey disliked Bush 
because he favored missile defense and offered less pay than Gore.  Although the 
question was not asked, one can infer the possible effects of Gore’s support of lifting the 
military ban on homosexuals and his support of Clinton’s defense policies from an 
officer’s comment on what determined his vote: “Open homosexuality.  I will leave the 
military when we allow social engineering to adversely affect readiness!!” As displayed 
in Table 4, 34 percent of Marine officers still believed Bush had a better military record 
than Gore, with 23 percent.  At the same time, 45 percent of Marine officers felt neither 
candidate had a better record.  As previously noted in Chapter II, Al Gore volunteered as 
an enlisted soldier during the Vietnam War while George W. Bush served as an officer in 
the Texas Air National Guard.  Al Gore’s service and Congressional record should have 




Table 4.   Opinions of the Military Records of Bush and Gore (In Percent) 
 
Question 17. Which candidate had the better military record? 
Weak or Strong for Gore Neither Weak or Strong for Bush 
23 45 32 
 
Novak and Page assert that the candidate’s character and personality are 
important factors for the American voter.212  Again, as shown in Table 5, the majority of 
Marine officers preferred Bush’s character and personality over those of Gore, and by a 
substantial margin. 
 













15. Which candidate’s character did you 
prefer? 
10 11 79 
16. Which candidate’s personality did you 
prefer? 
9 15 76 
 
The importance of character was evident in respondents’ comments on the survey.  
For example, an officer who preferred Gore stated: “Bush was an alcoholic and did 
cocaine.  He also has no clue on foreign policy.”  An officer who preferred Bush, 
however, felt “Gore seems to be a politician.  Bush is a leader.  The debates proved it to 
me.”  While another officer commented that Gore had an “appalling” moral and ethical 
base.   
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Anecdotal evidence suggested that Gore’s loyalty to President Clinton had 
negatively influenced military officers’ opinions of him and that officers’ opinions of 
Bush had been positively influenced by his father.  As shown in Table 6, 72 percent of 
respondents believed their opinion of Gore was negatively influenced by President 
Clinton.  This agrees with an officer’s comment on the survey that Gore had great 
domestic policies and adequate foreign policies but was overshadowed by his 
involvement with Clinton.  At the same time, 59 percent of respondents felt their opinion 
of George W. Bush was positively influenced by their experiences under his father’s 
administration.  This supports the notion that military officers still admire President Bush 
for his leadership during the Gulf War. 
 












26. Was your opinion of Al Gore positively 
or negatively influenced by your experience 
under President Clinton? 
72 22 6 
27. Was your opinion of George W. Bush 
positively or negatively influenced by your 
experience under President Bush? 
2 39 59 
 
Another officer’s comment supports the idea that Bush’s advisers were a factor:  
“Reputation of G. W. Bush ticket affiliates (Cheney and Powell) was strong influence in 
favor of voting for him.” 
Figure 1 shows how officers responded when asked to rank the importance of five 
factors.  As seen here, respondents tended to believe character was the strongest single 
influence in their decision, with 50 percent of respondents ranking it first.  As one officer 
commented:  “Character is what counted most in this election after having a President 
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with very little character and morals.”  Marine officers tended to rank defense policy 























Figure 1.   Ranking Importance of Candidate Factors 
 
Assigning a weighted score to respondent’s answers for each factor, however, 
produces slightly different results.213  As seen in Figure 2, character was still the 
strongest influence in their decision.  Domestic policy becomes second most important 
with defense policy third.  The importance of domestic policy issues to supporters of 
either candidate is evident in respondents’ comments.  Marine officers who supported 
Gore cited issues such as Social Security, Affirmative Action, and the environment.  
Marine officers who supported Bush cited issues such as welfare, economic policies, and 
abortion.  In any case, character still remains preeminent in importance for why Marine 
officers chose a particular candidate. 
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Figure 2.   Ranking Importance of Candidate Factors (Weighted Score) 
 
It is interesting to note that a small minority expressed their preference for neither 
Gore nor Bush.  Three officers commented that they voted for a third party candidate.  
Four officers said that they preferred John McCain, but voted for Bush as the next best 
alternative.  Two officers who preferred Bush believed their choice was the “lesser of two 
evils.”  Evidence of non-partisan behavior or voter apathy was reflected by one officer’s 
comment:  “I did not vote.  And don’t vote.” 
 
B. WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PARTY? 
As previously observed, some writers have claimed that the military has become a 
Republican “interest group.”  While the survey confirmed that respondents preferred 
Bush, it also shed some light on why Marine officers may identify with the Republican 
Party. 
 
1. Party Registration 
As seen in Table 7, when Marine officers were asked if they were currently 
registered with a political party, 54 percent, claimed to be registered as a Republican.  
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Only 8 percent said they were registered as a Democrat.  Thirty-eight percent of the 
respondents, however, claimed to have no preference or were not registered with any 
political party.  It is worth noting, however, that since 84 percent of respondents preferred 
Bush (Table 2), a sizable proportion of non-aligned officers still ended up supporting 
Bush.   
 
Table 7.   Political Party Registration of Marine Corps Officers (In Percent) 
 
Question 2. Are you currently registered with a political party?  If so, 
which party? 
Democrat Republican No preference/not registered 
8 54 38 
 
Although the number of minority respondents was small, it is interesting to note 
that, of the 8 percent of officers claiming to be registered as a Democrat, 45 percent were 
black.  In addition, 55 percent of black officers claimed to be a registered Democrat, 
while none claimed to be registered as a Republican.  Hispanics, on the other hand, 
tended to be Republican, with 60 percent of Hispanic respondents claiming to be 
registered as a Republican and none claiming to be registered as a Democrat.  These were 
the only easily discernible demographic trends throughout the results. 
 
2. Intensity of Political Party Involvement 
Table 8 summarizes the responses to questions used to explore the extent of 
officers’ preference for a political party.  Officers were first asked whether they had ever 
contributed their time or money to a political party.  Over eight out of ten Marine officers 
answered “no” to this question.  When asked if they contributed money prior to election 
2000, 91 percent answered “no.”  And, when asked whether they had attended any 
political party functions before election 2000, 96 percent answered “no.”  These results 
lend credence to the view that Marine Corps officers are more inclined to be political 
spectators than political actors. 
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Table 8.   Participation by Marine Corps Officers in Political Parties                            
(In Percent) 
 
Survey Question Democrat Republican Other No 
3. Have you ever contributed your time 
or money to a political party? If so, 
which party? 
2 15 1 82 
5. Did you make a financial contribution 
to a political party before the last 
Presidential election? 
1 7 1 91 
6. Did you attend any political party 
functions before the last election? 
0 4 0 96 
 
3. When Did Officers Choose Their Party? 
One explanation as to why the majority of Marine officers tend to support the 
Republican Party and its candidates is that persons with more conservative values may be 
inclined to join the Marine Corps.  To explore this premise, respondents were asked how 
long they had been affiliated with their political party of choice.  The vast majority of 
Marine Corps officers at NPS are captains or majors.  This means that, most of the 
respondents were commissioned either during President Bush’s term (before 1993) or 
during President Clinton’s first term (between 1993 and 1996).  Table 9 displays the 
percentages of when the Marine officers said they developed Republican tendencies.  Of 
those officers claiming to be registered as a Republican, 84 percent said they had 
determined their preference before 1992.  At that time, most of the respondents were 
newly commissioned or still in college, suggesting that the majority of respondents were 
Republican before they even joined the Marine Corps.  Table 9 also shows that over nine 
out of ten officers who were registered Democrats formed their political affiliation before 
1992.  The results in Table 9 generally suggest, then, that the respondents formed their 




Table 9.   Duration of Political Party Affiliation for Marine Corps Officers                 
(In Percent) 
 
Question 4. How long have you been affiliated 







Since before 1992 84 91 
Since 1993-1996 8 9 
Since 1994-2000 8 0 
 
4. What Do Officers Like About Their Party? 
As noted by Page, it is difficult at times to distinguish between certain Democrats 
and Republicans because political candidates of both parties often seek vote-winning 
middle platforms.  Enduring differences, however, do exist between the two parties.214  
Marine officers were asked to indicate which party they preferred based on the party’s 
domestic, foreign, and defense platforms.  Table 10 summarizes the results.  As expected, 
the vast majority of respondents preferred the Republican Party in every instance.  
Eighty-three percent of Marine officers supported the Republican Party because of its 
foreign policy platform and 90 percent supported the Republican platform on defense 
policy.  Over 60 percent strongly preferred the Republican platform for both.  Support 
was weaker for the Republican domestic policy platform, with only 43 percent strongly 
favoring Republican policies and 27 percent weakly favoring Republican policies.  Since 
only 54 percent claimed Republican registration, a significant number of non-aligned 
officers still seem to favor Republican party because of its established platform on major 
policy issues.  Since it cannot be determined here whether the respondents are familiar 
with the official platforms of the two parties, a more accurate statement is that the vast 
majority of Marine officers identify with what they perceive to be the Republican party 
positions on major issues.   
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7. Which party do you prefer because of its 
domestic policy platform? 
14 16 70 
8. Which party do you prefer because of its 
foreign policy platform? 
8 9 83 
9. Which party do you prefer because of its 
defense policy platform? 
4 6 90 
 
The small number of officers that preferred the Democratic platforms explained 
their preference in open comments.  A respondent who preferred the Democratic Party 
commented that Democrats had superior “environmental policies and separation of 
church and state ideals.”  Another commented: “I am an advocate of Social 
Security/Affirmative Action.  Thus, the Republican party tends not to support either.” 
On the other hand, a respondent who preferred the Republican Party based his 
choice on “economic policy, [its] stand on abortion and welfare-related issues, and 
foreign policy.”  Another respondent attributed the improved economy of the late 1990s 
to a Republican congress.  And yet another officer believed that, “On nearly every single 
issue, the Democratic party caters to the lazy and is pushing us toward a socialist state.” 
Evidence of non-partisanship could be found in one respondent’s comment:  “I do 
not dwell on party affiliations.  I consider myself conservative.”  And yet another 
considered himself an “…independent Educated Voter…”   
Regardless of which party they supported, it appears that respondents thought 
about the issues and chose their respective political parties for reasons that were 





5. Party or Candidate? 
As cited earlier, Dowd believed military officers voted for the “man” rather than 
the party.  As shown in Table 11, when asked about the importance of a candidate’s party 
versus a candidate’s stance on issues, 76 percent of Marine officers felt that issues were 
more important than party.  Thirteen percent felt they were equally important, and 11 
percent felt that a candidate’s party was more important.  The majority of the 11 percent 
that felt party was more important said they were registered as a Republican.  While it 
appears most officers do select candidates based on issues, Page asserts that selection of a 
candidate based solely on political party is not necessarily irrational.  Page claims that 
party voting is an effective and sensible substitute for issue-voting, because a person can 
be reasonably confident that a Democratic or Republican candidate stands closer to their 
opinions if the voter is a Democrat or Republican.  Using party identification saves voters 
a lot of time, since most people have better things to do than follow everything a 
candidate says or does.215 
 
Table 11.   Importance of Candidate’s Party Versus Candidate’s Issues 
 
Question 11. Which would you say is more important in 
your voting choice, the candidate’s political party or the 
candidate’s stance on specific issues? 
Percent 
Party is somewhat or very important 11 
Both about equal 13 
Issues are somewhat or very important 76 
 
C. WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF ETHOS? 
Literary evidence has established the importance of culture and ethos to Marine 
officers.  The foundation of Marine Corps culture is its core values of honor, courage, and 
commitment.  Respondents were asked which candidate better exemplified these values.  
They were also asked which candidate they thought would best support a “warfighting” 
ethos.  The results are displayed in Table 12.  As seen here, 75 percent of officers 
                                                 
215 Page, 104. 
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believed Bush best exemplified the core values of the Marine Corps.  Despite the 
previously-cited officer’s comment about Bush’s moral deficiencies, the majority of 
officers still felt that Bush best exemplified honor, courage, and commitment.  An even 
greater majority, 85 percent, believed Bush would better support a “warfighting” ethos.  
As mentioned in the literature review, Marine officers believed the issues of homosexuals 
in the service and women in combat were harmful to warfighting effectiveness.216  Gore 
was perceived as being an advocate for both.217  This may help to explain the resulting 
preference for Bush. 
 











19. Which candidate best exemplified Marine 
Corps’ core values? 
7 18 75 
20. Which candidate did you think would best 
support a “warfighting” ethos? 
4 10 85 
 
 
D. WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF PRESIDENT CLINTON? 
 
1. President Clinton and the Military 
As discussed in Chapter II, President Clinton and the military were often at odds.  
Officers were especially concerned about the state of the military during Clinton’s 
administration and Clinton’s leadership.  Table 13 summarizes respondents’ answers 
concerning President Clinton’s effect on the military.  As seen in Table 13, 86 percent of 
officers surveyed believed the military became physically weaker during Clinton’s 
presidency.  At the same time, 81 percent of respondents believed that the military’s 
culture was weakened during the Clinton administration.  In the words of one officer, 
                                                 
216 “Regarding Women in Combat,” 29-30. 
217 Myers, 3. 
62 
regarding the military’s culture, “former President Clinton hastened the moral decay of 
the U.S. military.” 
 











21. Did the military get physically stronger or 
weaker under President Clinton? 
(readiness/equipment/weapons systems) 
86 6 8 
22. Did the military’s culture get stronger or 
weaker under President Clinton? (warfighting 
ethos/esprit de corps/discipline) 
81 15 4 
 
2. President Clinton and the Country 
Respondents were asked how the state of the nation changed during President 
Clinton’s terms.  When asked if the country got economically stronger or weaker under 
President Clinton, 90 percent believed the country’s economy got stronger.  Since it is 
generally accepted that the nation’s economy was strong during his administration, this 
question served to test respondents for obvious bias against President Clinton.  Several 
officers commented, however, that they believed the Republican congress or other 
factors, not Clinton’s leadership, were responsible for the strong economy.   
To examine the effect of the Lewinsky scandal, respondents were asked how they 
felt about the American people’s moral standards during President Clinton’s terms.  
Seventy-nine percent of officers surveyed felt that the American people’s moral standards 
declined under President Clinton.  This agrees with assertions that military officers, 
unlike the majority of Americans, were unable to forgive President Clinton’s behavior. 
As summarized in Table 14, respondents overall believed the country prospered 

















23. Did the country get economically stronger or 
weaker under President Clinton? 
6 4 90 
24. Did the American people’s moral standards 
get higher or lower during President Clinton’s 
terms? 
79 16 3 
 
3. President Clinton’s Effect on Officers’ Votes 
The Marine officers who responded to the survey served during the Clinton 
administration.  Table 15 shows how respondents’ votes may have been influenced by 
their service under President Clinton.  Seventy-four percent of respondents felt their 
experiences under President Clinton influenced them to vote for Bush.  It is interesting to 
note that, out of those officers that claimed no party preference or registration, 77 percent 
said they were influenced by President Clinton to vote for Bush.  The results in Table 15 
suggest that President Clinton’s performance had a significant effect on the voting 
decisions of Marine officers.  This agrees with Page’s assertion that, while voters may not 
know what candidates stand for or what their policies mean, they do know what they 
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Table 15.   President Clinton’s Effect on Voting 
 
Question 25. How did your experiences during the 
Clinton administration influence your vote? Percent 
Strong or Weak influence to vote for Gore 8 
No influence 18 
Strong or Weak influence to vote for Bush 74 
 
Respondents’ comments agree with this observation.  For example, one officer 
stated that he was influenced by “two deployments under Clinton enforcing an unclear 
foreign policy toward Iraq.”  Another officer believed “the presidency is the last bastion 
of integrity.  President Clinton tarnished it severely, and got away with it.” 
 
E.  WHAT MATTERED MOST? 
Respondents were asked to rank various factors as being most important in their 
voting decision.  As seen in Figure 3, 45 percent of officers ranked Candidate first.  Close 
behind was Core Values or Ethos, with 34 percent of officers saying it was most 
important.  Somewhat surprisingly, Political Party received a relatively high ranking as a 
moderate influence, with 36 percent of officers selecting it as third most important.  
Service under President Clinton tended to be ranked fourth by the most respondents.  
These results indicate the importance of the individual candidate and officers’ values over 


































Figure 3.   Ranking Importance of Voting Factors 
 
As seen in Figure 4, assigning weighted scores to respondents’ answers results in 
the same ranking.219  Candidate and Core Values come out as the two most important 

























Figure 4.   Ranking Importance of Voting Factors (Weighted Score) 
                                                 
219 Weighted scores determined using same method used with Candidate factors.  See note 213. 
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F.  WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF PEER PRESSURE? 
 
1. Effect of Social Group 
Regardless of personal political beliefs, as displayed in Table 16, the vast majority 
of Marine officers felt that most of their peers voted for and supported Bush.  Ninety-four 
percent of respondents thought most officers voted for Bush and 93 percent of 
respondents felt that most officers supported Bush.  The source of these beliefs is 
uncertain, but the results confirm that Marine officers perceive their social group as 
having had a very strong preference for George W. Bush.  Indeed, no respondent felt that 
“other Marine officers” voted for Gore or that “most Marine officers” would have 
supported Gore.  The few officers who did not select Bush as the candidate of choice for 
Marine officers indicated “no idea.” 
 
Table 16.   How Marine Officers Think Their Peers Voted (In Percent) 
 








29. How do you think other 
Marine officers voted? 
0 5 1 94 
30. Which candidate do you feel 
was supported by most Marine 
officers?  
0 6 1 93 
 
Another social group to consider is the respondent’s family.220  Of those officers 
who claimed Democratic registration, 64 percent stated that their family was primarily 
Democrat.  Of those who claimed Republican registration, 59 percent answered that their 
family was primarily Republican.  Out of all respondents, 50 percent claimed to come 
from a Republican family, while 23 percent claimed to come from a Democratic family.  
                                                 
220 Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 140. 
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Therefore, many respondents may be predisposed toward a certain political party before 
ever joining the Marine Corps. 
 
2. How Officers Were Influenced by Their Peers 
Generally, respondents do not admit to being influenced by their peers’ political 
beliefs.  As seen in Table 17, 69 percent of Marine officers felt their fellow Marines had 
no influence.  At the same time, 31 percent of officers surveyed did say that their peers 
had some influence, but only one percent felt that their peers exerted “a great deal” of 
influence.  No trends were evident by party registration; that is, officers claiming to be 
registered Democrats answered in about the same frequency as did officers claiming to be 
registered Republicans. 
 
Table 17.   The Influence of Peers (In Percent) 
 
Survey Question 




 A great deal  
 
31. Do you think you were influenced at all 
by the discussions, opinions, and comments 
of your fellow Marines? 
69 30 1 
 
3. Should Officers Support a Candidate? 
Table 18 shows that 55 percent of Marine officers did not feel it was important for 
their peers to support a candidate.  This could be an indication that respondents were not 
concerned with how, or if, their fellow Marines voted.  At the same time, 27 percent of 
respondents felt that it was very important for officers to support one candidate or 
another.  These officers might be in agreement with Marines cited in the literature review, 
who believe the responsibilities of citizenship make it important for Marines to 




Table 18.   Importance of Supporting Candidates (In Percent) 
 





32. Did you feel it was important for Marine 
officers to support one candidate or 
another? 
55 18 27 
 
4. Deviants from the Group Norm 
Almost half (48 percent) of Marine officers indicated that they had never seen 
officers with politically deviant opinions viewed in a negative manner.  Almost the same 
proportion, 43 percent, however, felt that they had sometimes seen a negative reaction 
toward an officer with a political opinion not supported by most of his or her peers.  
Almost one in ten Marine officers believed they had seen negative reactions often.  
Basically, this suggests the presence of some pressure on officers who were deviants 
from the group norm.  When examining the results from the perspective of those with less 
popular political views, officers claiming to be registered Democrats, the percentages are 
divided more evenly.  As seen in Table 19, 73 percent of officers who claimed to be 
registered Democrat had seen negative reactions sometimes or often.  It is difficult to 
draw conclusions from this result, because the number of officers who claimed to be 
registered Democrat was small.  It is also likely that these Democrats were the targets of 
the negative opinions or reaction, since their views were clearly in the minority. 
 
Table 19.   Negative Reactions to Political Deviation 
 
Question 33. Have you ever seen or heard a negative 
opinion or reaction toward a Marine who may have 
openly expressed support for a candidate or platform 







Never 48 27 
Sometimes 43 46 
Often 9 27 
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G. SUMMARY 
This chapter examines the results of the survey, looking at the effects on voting of 
five variables:  the candidates; the political party; the Marine Corps ethos; President 
Clinton; and peer pressure.   
Marine Corps officers preferred George W. Bush by a large majority.  This agrees 
with the perception that military members voted primarily for Bush.  The majority of 
officers favored Bush’s stance on issues and preferred his character and personality.  As 
anecdotal evidence indicated, President Clinton influenced the majority of officers to vote 
against Al Gore, while positive experiences with President Bush had some influence on a 
majority of officers to favor his son, George W. Bush.  Results indicate that respondents 
felt the candidate’s character was of primary importance to their voting choice.   
As seen in Chapter II, the prevailing view is that military officers are Republican 
partisans.  Over half of Marine officers surveyed did claim to be registered Republican.  
The vast majority of respondents, however, did not participate in the activities of their 
political party.  In addition, the results indicate that most Marine officers decided on their 
political affiliation before joining the service, suggesting that self-selection is the likely 
cause of the current imbalance in political representation within the Marine Corps.  The 
majority of respondents favored the Republican Party for all of its stated platforms, but 
especially for its stance on defense issues.  Results indicate that respondents considered 
the candidate’s position on issues more important than the candidate’s political party.   
For the Marine officers surveyed, most felt Bush better exemplified their values 
than did Gore.  The majority of respondents also felt Bush would better support a 
“warfighting” ethos. 
The Marine officers held a very negative view of President Clinton.  In fact, most 
officers surveyed felt that President Clinton hurt the military and the country.  As it 
turned out, officers’ views of President Clinton influenced a considerable proportion of 
officers to vote for Bush. 
When comparing the effects of the above factors, the majority of respondents felt 
that the individual candidate or Marine Corps values were the most important factors in 
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their voting choice.  According to the Marine officers, the candidate’s political party and 
President Clinton were less important. 
Almost every officer believed his or her peers supported and voted for Bush, but 
most claimed that they were not influenced by the discussions, opinions, or comments of 
other Marines.  Most respondents did not think it was important for Marines to support a 
candidate. At the same time, over half had seen or heard Marines react negatively to 
people having different political beliefs. 
Overall, results confirmed perceptions that Marine officers are predominantly 
Republican and strongly favored Bush in the election.  Respondents do not appear, 
however, to be politically active beyond voting, and their voting choice is based on a 




V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study examines the voting behavior of Marine officers during the 
presidential election of 2000.  A 39-question survey was distributed to Marine Corps 
officers who were attending the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in 
August of 2001.  The primary research question sought to determine which candidate 
Marine officers preferred and why.  Secondary questions related to the effects of political 
party, Marine Corps values, President Clinton, and peer pressure on the voting behavior 
of Marine officers. 
  
A. SUMMARY 
The main findings that emerged from this study are as follows:  1) The vast 
majority of Marine officers favored George W. Bush; 2) Although more than half of 
Marine officers claimed to be registered Republicans, very few were active in party 
activities and the Republican party was not a primary factor in their voting choice; 3) 
Most Marine officers felt that George W. Bush was more closely aligned with the values 
and ethos of the Marine Corps than was Al Gore; 4) President Clinton left a negative 
impression with the majority of Marine officers and this impression influenced them to 
vote against Al Gore; 5) The most influential factors for Marine officers were the 
individual candidate and his core values, not the political party; 6) Most Marine officers 
perceived their peers as supporting and voting for George W. Bush, but they did not 
generally feel that their fellow Marines had significant influence over their voting choice.   
More specifically, 84 percent of respondents preferred George W. Bush, while 
only 12 percent of respondents favored Al Gore.  Marine officers overwhelmingly 
favored Bush’s platform for domestic, foreign, and defense policies.  At the same time, 
over 70 percent of respondents preferred Bush’s character and personality.  Although 
Marine officers were less favorable toward Bush’s military record, 75 percent felt he 
better exemplified Marine values, and 85 percent felt that he would better support a 
“warfighting” ethos.   
A majority of respondents, 54 percent, claimed to have registered as a 
Republican, while only 8 percent claimed to be registered Democrat.  Over one-third of 
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Marine officers claimed no preference or were not registered with a political party.  
Although Marine officers clearly favored Republican policies, over 80 percent had never 
donated time or money to a political party, and over 90 percent did not participate in 
party activities prior to election 2000.  Seventy-six percent of respondents believed that 
the candidate’s stance on major issues was more important than the candidate’s political 
party.  Finally, 84 percent of Marine officers who claimed to be registered with a political 
party had probably formed their political preference before joining the Marine Corps, 
suggesting that the apparent ideological imbalance among Marine officers is more a 
result of self-selection than political indoctrination or socialization. 
In the eyes of most respondents, President Clinton’s legacy to the military was a 
negative one.  Over 80 percent of Marine officers surveyed felt the military had become 
weaker both physically and culturally under President Clinton.  The split in moral values 
between Marine officers and civilians was displayed by the results that, although most 
officers agree the country prospered during President Clinton’s two terms, 79 percent of 
Marine officers surveyed felt that America’s moral standards had declined under his 
leadership.  Even though the majority of respondents may have voted for Bush regardless 
of Clinton’s terms, 74 percent of respondents claimed that their experiences during the 
Clinton years influenced them to vote for Bush. 
The perception of over 90 percent of respondents was that the majority of Marine 
officers supported and voted for Bush.  Although this indicates a perception of group 
ideology, 99 percent of respondents did not feel that their peers exercised “a great deal” 
of influence over their political opinions.  This does not mean, however, that pressure to 
conform to the group norm were absent:  over half of Marine officers reported that they 
had witnessed negative reactions toward those who did not support the Republican (most 
popular) line.  Finally, a majority of respondents, 55 percent, did not feel it was important 
for their fellow Marines to support a candidate at all. 
Overall, respondents felt that the candidate was the most important factor in their 
voting decision.  The next most important factor was the values of the Marine Corps.  




The results of this study only reflect the opinions of Marine officers attending the 
Naval Postgraduate School during August 2001 and may not apply to all Marine officers 
or Marines as a whole.  They may serve however, to improve knowledge of how Marines 
tend to think and what they tend to value, and thereby increase our understanding of civil-
military relations in the early 21st century. 
Although the data confirm perceptions that the majority of Marine officers are 
Republican and favored Bush in the election, the results also suggest that Marine officers’ 
voting behavior is not caused by party partisanship alone.  Respondents do not appear to 
be politically active beyond voting, and their voting choice is motivated by more than just 
party identification.   
One can conclude, then, that Marine officers’ voting behavior is not just the result 
of being a partisan interest group but also tends to be a manifestation of their warrior 
values and attitudes.  Rather than a decline in professionalism, their voting behavior 
reflects their strong devotion to the profession of arms.  The Marine Corps is a tight-knit, 
cohesive, social group with high esprit de corps and a strong culture.  A culture, that may 
be different, but not without purpose.  Perhaps society should not be alarmed or surprised 
that Marines share similar beliefs and attitudes.  As supported by this study, the Marine 
Corps, for a variety of reasons, is a remarkably homogeneous organization with regards 
to political ideology.  Despite the imbalanced representation of the nation’s political 
spectrum, it is the very strength of the Marine Corps culture and values that ensure the 
organization continues as loyal servants of the American people.  The Marine Corps 
values of honor, courage, and commitment support the rule of law and the basic 
principles of our Constitution and government, thereby preventing the Praetorianism 
exhibited by less professional military forces. 
Evidence indicates Marines behave like most voters.  They vote for people they 
believe will look out for their interests.  They vote based on what is important to them.  
They vote for people they admire and respect.  What is important for the American 
people to realize is that there is nothing unusual about what they believe in or why they 
tend to vote one way or the other.  Marines are professional warriors who fight for the 
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American people wherever and whenever called.  They are not a dangerous fringe group 
that desires control of the government or the American people it serves.  While some 
Marine officers criticize candidates or political parties, none of the respondents advocates 
or suggests that all Marines should support the same political party.  As General Charles 
Krulak writes, any identification of Marine officers with a particular political party or as 
a political interest group “assumes Marine officers are ‘lemmings’ vice rationale 
professionals.”221   
The consistent thread through all these arguments is the influence of Marines’ 
values and their belief in the Marine Corps’ role as a fighting force.  Their political 
alignment, their culture, their opinions of leaders, are all driven by their strong belief in 
the ethos and values of the Marine Corps.  When we examine how they voted and why, 
we find what we are studying is a conflict of values.  The values of some, who claim the 
Marines are extremists and disconnected from society versus the values of the Marine 
Corps, who claim their culture and beliefs make them the professional fighting force 
needed by America.  General Charles Krulak had this to say recently about the Marines’ 
struggle to maintain its values:  
The epic film, ‘Gladiator,’ has been a great success in our Country partly 
because it resuscitates the age-old ideal of the noble warrior, the individual 
who puts honor, integrity and accountability above all else, and in so 
doing, creates and sustains an ethos of selflessness and sacrifice…Today, 
our military desperately wants to manifest these attributes but external 
forces as well as internal faults largely prevent it from being able to do 
so…beyond a new Defense Strategy, new weapons systems, a national 
missile defense, pay raises etc. lies the military’s true need:  a restoration 
of the culture of nobility that is at the core of our military.222 
 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The political spectrum of Marine officers appears to be imbalanced.  The 
organization is dissimilar politically and ideologically from the nation as a whole.  
Whether this is a cause for concern requires further study.  At this time, it does not appear 
to affect the Marine Corps’ ability to serve our nation as professional warriors.  Since 
                                                 
221 General Charles C. Krulak USMC (ret) e-mail. 
222 Ibid. 
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much of the imbalance is apparently the result of self-selection, the recent terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 may witness a new generation of more politically diverse men and 
women becoming Marine officers as more Americans of all political beliefs may seek to 
serve. 
If the American people determine that the military should be politically balanced, 
then further research should be focused on determining why Americans who prefer the 
Democratic party do not join the military in the same numbers as those who prefer the 
Republican party and why Americans support the values or positions of the two parties.  
In light of the continued need for new volunteers, especially in time of war, the military 
may not be tapping a large source of manpower. 
The civil-military tensions that accompanied election 2000 will probably fade 
with a Republican administration and the current focus on fighting a war against 
terrorism.  The Marine Corps, and the military as a whole, should continue to emphasize 
professionalism and enforce regulations concerning political activities.   
In the end, the American people determine what kind of Marine Corps and what 
kind of Marines serve our country.  The people set the standards by which Marines exist.  
As Lieutenant General Krulak writes:  
 We exist today—we flourish today—not because of what we know we 
are, or what we know we can do, but because of what the grassroots of our 
country believes we are and believes we can do…The American people 
believe that Marines are downright good for the country; that the Marines 
are masters of a form of unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented 
youths into proud, self-reliant, stable citizens—citizens into whose hands 
the nation’s affairs may safely be entrusted…And, likewise, should the 
people ever lose that conviction—as a result of our failure to meet their 
high, almost spiritual standards, the Marine Corps will quickly 
disappear.223 
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APPENDIX A. MARINE CORPS OFFICER SURVEY 
INTRODUCTION 
Thank you for taking this survey.  I am conducting this survey to explore the 
political attitudes and voting behavior of Marine Corps Naval Postgraduate students in 
the recent presidential election.  As you may know, the military vote garnered some 
attention recently, but there is not much data on which candidate people in the military 
actually voted for or why they chose particular candidates.  I hope to find some answers 
with this survey.  There are 39 questions that will take approximately ten minutes to 
answer.  The results will be compiled so that percentages and averages can be reported in 
my thesis.  Personal information will be strictly confidential and all officers’ comments 
and answers will remain anonymous.  I will, however, share the final statistical results 
with interested officers.  Note – THIS SURVEY IS FOR MARINE CORPS NAVAL 
POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS ONLY AND IS STRICTLY VOLUNTARY! 
 
WHO DID THEY VOTE FOR? 
1. Who did you prefer in the 2000 presidential election? 
Strong for Gore 
Weak for Gore 
Other 
Weak for Bush 
Strong for Bush 
 
EFFECT OF PARTY? 




No preference/not registered 
 






4. How long have you been affiliated with your current political party of choice? 
Since before 1992 
Since 1993-1996 
Since 1996-2000 
Never joined a party or preferred one 
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10. Does your family (father, mother, siblings) tend to primarily support one party over 












11. Which would you say is more important in your voting choice, the candidate's 
political party or the candidate’s stance on specific issues? 
Party is very important 
Party is somewhat important 
Both about equal 
Issues are somewhat important 
Issues are very important 
 
OPINIONS OF CANDIDATES? 
 



















































18. Rank in order of importance to you the following: 
Candidate’s defense policy 
Candidate’s domestic policy 




EFFECT OF ETHOS? 
 
19. Which candidate best exemplified Marine Corps’ core values? 
Strong Gore  
Weak Gore 




20. Which candidate did you think would best support a "warfighting" ethos? 
Strong Gore 
Weak Gore 




EFFECT OF CLINTON? 
 








22. Did the military’s culture get stronger or weaker under President Clinton? 






















25. How did your experiences during the Clinton administration influence your vote? 
Strong influence to vote for Gore 
Weak influence to vote for Gore 
No influence 
Weak influence to vote for Bush 
Strong influence to vote for Bush 
 
26. Was your opinion of Al Gore positively or negatively influenced by your experience 







27. Was your opinion of George W. Bush positively or negatively influenced by your 








IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT FACTORS? 
 
28. Rank in order of importance to you the factor that most influenced your vote. 
Candidate 
Party 





EFFECT OF MARINE PEERS 
 
29. How do you think other Marine officers voted? 
Most voted for Gore 










31. Do you think you were influenced at all by the discussions, opinions, and comments 
of your fellow Marines? 
Not at all 
Some 
A great deal 
 





33. Have you ever seen or heard a negative opinion or reaction toward a Marine who may 



































38. What is your MOS community? 
Aviation 





39. Do you have any other comments as to what influenced your vote? 
 
CONCLUSION 
Thank you again for taking the time to fill out this survey.  I will be happy to share the 
final statistical results of the survey with anyone interested.  Again, no personal identities 
or answers will be revealed and comments will remain anonymous.  If you wish to make 
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APPENDIX B. SURVEY RESPONSE FREQUENCIES 
This appendix contains response frequencies for the Marine Corps NPS student survey. 
 
WHO DID THEY VOTE FOR? 
 
1. Who did you prefer in the 2000 presidential election? 
138 Eligible Respondents 
138 Respondents Answered Question # 1 
    1-1    11   7.97% Strong for Gore 
    1-2     6   4.35% Weak for Gore 
    1-3     6   4.35% Other 
    1-4    31  22.46% Weak for Bush 
    1-5    84  60.87% Strong for Bush 
            0   0.00% Missing Cases 
 
EFFECT OF PARTY? 
 
2. Are you currently registered with a political party?  If so, which party? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 2 
    2-1    11   8.03% Democrat 
    2-2    74  54.01% Republican 
    2-3     0   0.00% Other 
    2-4    52  37.96% No preference/not registered 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
 
3. Have you ever contributed your time or money to a political party?  If so, which party? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 3 
    3-1     3   2.19% Democrat 
    3-2    20  14.60% Republican 
    3-3     1   0.73% Other 
    3-4   113  82.48% None 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
4. How long have you been affiliated with your current political party of choice? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 4 
    4-1    79  57.66% Since before 1992 
    4-2     8   5.84% Since 1993-1996 
    4-3     7   5.11% Since 1996-2000 
    4-4    43  31.39% Never joined a party or preferred one 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
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5. Did you make a financial contribution to a political party before the last Presidential 
election? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 5 
    5-1   125  91.24% No 
    5-2     1   0.73% Democratic Party 
    5-3     9   6.57% Republican Party 
    5-4     2   1.46% Other 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
6. Did you attend any political party functions before the last election? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 6 
    6-1   130  95.59% No 
    6-2     0   0.00% Democratic 
    6-3     5   3.68% Republican 
    6-4     1   0.74% Other 
            2   1.45% Missing Cases 
 
7. Which party do you prefer because of its domestic policy platform? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 7 
    7-1    11   8.03% Strong Democratic 
    7-2     8   5.84% Weak Democratic 
    7-3    22  16.06% Neither 
    7-4    37  27.01% Weak Republican 
    7-5    59  43.07% Strong Republican 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
8. Which party do you prefer because of its foreign policy platform? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 8 
    8-1     9   6.62% Strong Democratic 
    8-2     2   1.47% Weak Democratic 
    8-3    12   8.82% Neither 
    8-4    31  22.79% Weak Republican 
    8-5    82  60.29% Strong Republican 
            2   1.45% Missing Cases 
 
9. Which party do you prefer because of its defense policy platform? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 9 
    9-1     6   4.38% Strong Democratic 
    9-2     0   0.00% Weak Democratic 
    9-3     8   5.84% Neither 
    9-4    31  22.63% Weak Republican 
    9-5    92  67.15% Strong Republican 





10. Does your family (father, mother, siblings) tend to primarily support one party over 
the other?  If so, which party? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 10 
   10-1    31  22.79% Democrat 
   10-2    68  50.00% Republican 
   10-3     1   0.74% Other 
   10-4    36  26.47% None 
            2   1.45% Missing Cases 
 
11. Which would you say is more important in your voting choice, the candidate's 
political party or the candidate’s stance on specific issues? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 11 
   11-1     6   4.38% Party is very important 
   11-2     9   6.57% Party is somewhat important 
   11-3    18  13.14% Both about equal 
   11-4    13   9.49% Issues are somewhat important 
   11-5    91  66.42% Issues are very important 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
OPINIONS OF CANDIDATES? 
 
12. Which candidate's domestic platform did you prefer? (abortion/gun control/social 
security) 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 12 
   12-1    11   8.09% Strong Gore 
   12-2    14  10.29% Weak Gore 
   12-3     8   5.88% Neither 
   12-4    39  28.68% Weak Bush 
   12-5    64  47.06% Strong Bush 
            2   1.45% Missing Cases 
 
13. Which candidate's foreign policy platform did you prefer? 
(peacekeeping/international trade) 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 13 
   13-1     8   5.84% Strong Gore 
   13-2     7   5.11% Weak Gore 
   13-3     9   6.57% Neither 
   13-4    44  32.12% Weak Bush 
   13-5    69  50.36% Strong Bush 







14. Which candidate's defense policy platform did you prefer? (weapons/missions/quality 
of life) 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 14 
   14-1     5   3.65% Strong Gore 
   14-2     3   2.19% Weak Gore 
   14-3     7   5.11% Neither 
   14-4    34  24.82% Weak Bush 
   14-5    88  64.23% Strong Bush 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
15. Which candidate's character did you prefer?  
137 Respondents Answered Question # 15 
   15-1    10   7.30% Strong Gore 
   15-2     4   2.92% Weak Gore 
   15-3    16  11.68% Neither 
   15-4    20  14.60% Weak Bush 
   15-5    87  63.50% Strong Bush 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
16. Which candidate’s personality did you prefer? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 16 
   16-1     8   5.84% Strong Gore 
   16-2     4   2.92% Weak Gore 
   16-3    21  15.33% Neither 
   16-4    37  27.01% Weak Bush 
   16-5    67  48.91% Strong Bush 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
17. Which candidate had the better military record?  
137 Respondents Answered Question # 17 
   17-1    14  10.22% Strong Gore 
   17-2    18  13.14% Weak Gore 
   17-3    62  45.26% Neither 
   17-4    21  15.33% Weak Bush 
   17-5    22  16.06% Strong Bush 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
18. Rank in order of importance to you the following: 
               Ranked  1     Ranked  2     Ranked  3     Ranked  4     Ranked  5 
defense policy      15  11.28%    45  31.47%   39  28.89%   33  25.19%  3   2.31% 
domestic policy     33  24.81%    36  25.17%   40  29.63%   23  17.56%  2   1.54% 
foreign policy      13   9.77%    36  25.17%    41  30.37%   32  24.43%  11   8.46% 
character           66  49.62%    17  11.89%   12   8.89%    36  27.48%  4   3.08% 
personality          6   4.51%      9   6.29%     3   2.22%      7   5.34%    110  84.62% 
Missing Cases    2   1.48%       -8  -5.93%     0   0.00%      4   2.96%    5   3.70% 
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EFFECT OF ETHOS? 
 
19. Which candidate best exemplified Marine Corps’ core values? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 19 
   19-1     4   2.94% Stong Gore 
   19-2     6   4.41% Weak Gore 
   19-3    24  17.65% Both about equal 
   19-4    44  32.35% Weak Bush 
   19-5    58  42.65% Strong Bush 
            2   1.45% Missing Cases 
 
 
20. Which candidate did you think would best support a "warfighting" ethos? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 20 
   20-1     3   2.21% Stong Gore 
   20-2     3   2.21% Weak Gore 
   20-3    14  10.29% Both about equal 
   20-4    48  35.29% Weak Bush 
   20-5    68  50.00% Strong Bush 
            2   1.45% Missing Cases 
 
EFFECT OF CLINTON? 
 
21. Did the military get physically stronger or weaker under President Clinton? 
(readiness/equipment/weapons systems) 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 21 
   21-1    64  46.72% Much weaker 
   21-2    53  38.69% Somewhat weaker 
   21-3     9   6.57% No change 
   21-4     8   5.84% Somewhat stronger 
   21-5     3   2.19% Much stronger 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
22. Did the military’s culture get stronger or weaker under President Clinton? 
(warfighting ethos/esprit de corps/discipline) 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 22 
   22-1    72  52.55% Much weaker 
   22-2    39  28.47% Somewhat weaker 
   22-3    20  14.60% No change 
   22-4     4   2.92% Somewhat stronger 
   22-5     2   1.46% Much stronger 






23. Did the country get economically stronger or weaker under President Clinton? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 23 
   23-1     1   0.74% Much weaker 
   23-2     7   5.15% Somewhat weaker 
   23-3     6   4.41% No change 
   23-4    65  47.79% Somewhat stronger 
   23-5    57  41.91% Much stronger 
            2   1.45% Missing Cases 
 
24. Did the American people’s moral standards get higher or lower during President 
Clinton’s terms? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 24 
   24-1    64  46.72% Much lower 
   24-2    47  34.31% Somewhat lower 
   24-3    22  16.06% No change 
   24-4     0   0.00% Somewhat higher 
   24-5     4   2.92% Much higher 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
25. How did your experiences during the Clinton administration influence your vote? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 25 
   25-1     8   5.84% Strong influence to vote for Gore 
   25-2     2   1.46% Weak influence to vote for Gore 
   25-3    25  18.25% No influence 
   25-4    26  18.98% Weak influence to vote for Bush 
   25-5    76  55.47% Strong influence to vote for Bush 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
26. Was your opinion of Al Gore positively or negatively influenced by your experience 
under President Clinton? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 26 
   26-1    46  33.82% Strongly negative 
   26-2    52  38.24% Somewhat negative 
   26-3    30  22.06% No influence 
   26-4     3   2.21% Somewhat positive 
   26-5     5   3.68% Strongly positive 











27. Was your opinion of George W. Bush positively or negatively influenced by your 
experience under President Bush? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 27 
   27-1     3   2.21% Strongly negative 
   27-2     0   0.00% Somewhat negative 
   27-3    53  38.97% No influence 
   27-4    54  39.71% Somewhat positive 
   27-5    26  19.12% Strongly positive 
            2   1.45% Missing Cases 
 
IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT FACTORS? 
 
28. Rank in order of importance to you the factor that most influenced your vote. 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 28 
   Ranked  1     Ranked  2     Ranked  3     Ranked  4     Ranked  5                                     
Candidate          61  44.53%   43  31.85%    19  14.07%   9   7.03%     4   3.13% 
Political party   7   5.11%      31  22.96%    49  36.30%   34  26.56%  15  11.72% 
President Clinton      8   5.84%      11   8.15%     29  21.48%   48  37.50%   37  28.91% 
Core values/ethos     46  33.58%    43  31.85%   27  20.00%    19  14.84%  1   0.78% 
Other      15  10.95%    7   5.19%      11   8.15%    18  14.06%   71  55.47% 
 
EFFECT OF MARINE PEERS 
 
29. How do you think other Marine officers voted? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 29 
   29-1     0   0.00% Most voted for Gore 
   29-2   129  94.16% Most voted for Bush 
   29-3     1   0.73% Evenly divided 
   29-4     7   5.11% No idea 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
30. Which candidate do you feel was supported by most Marine officers? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 30 
   30-1     0   0.00% Gore 
   30-2   127  93.38% Bush 
   30-3     1   0.74% Other 
   30-4     8   5.88% No idea 
            2   1.45% Missing Cases 
 
31. Do you think you were influenced at all by the discussions, opinions, and comments 
of your fellow Marines? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 31 
   31-1    94  68.61% Not at all 
   31-2    42  30.66% Some 
   31-3     1   0.73% A great deal 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
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32. Did you feel it was important for Marine officers to support one candidate or another? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 32 
   32-1    75  54.74% Not important 
   32-2    25  18.25% Somewhat important 
   32-3    37  27.01% Very important 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
33. Have you ever seen or heard a negative opinion or reaction toward a Marine who may 
have openly expressed support for a candidate or platform not supported by most of your 
peers? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 33 
   33-1    66  48.18% Never 
   33-2    59  43.07% Sometimes 
   33-3    12   8.76% Often 




34. What region of the country are you from? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 34 
   34-1    28  20.44% Northeast 
   34-2    45  32.85% South 
   34-3    37  27.01% Midwest 
   34-4    27  19.71% West 
            1   0.72% Missing Cases 
 
35. What was your commissioning source? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 35 
   35-1    48  35.29% PLC/OCS 
   35-2    30  22.06% ROTC 
   35-3    32  23.53% USNA 
   35-4    26  19.12% MECEP/ECP 
            2   1.45% Missing Cases 
 
36. What is your sex? 
137 Respondents Answered Question # 36 
   36-1   135  98.54% Male 
   36-2     2   1.46% Female 









37. What is your race/ethnicity? 
134 Respondents Answered Question # 37 
   37-1   118  88.06% White/Caucasian 
   37-2     9   6.72% Black/African-American 
   37-3     5   3.73% Hispanic 
   37-4     2   1.49% Other 
            4   2.90% Missing Cases 
 
38. What is your MOS community? 
136 Respondents Answered Question # 38 
   38-1    37  27.21% Aviation 
   38-2    40  29.41% Ground combat arms 
   38-3    59  43.38% Support 
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APPENDIX C. SELECTED WRITTEN COMMENTS  
Strong for Gore 
 
Bush was an alcoholic and did cocaine. He also has no clue on foreign policy. 
 
Superior Democratic Environmental Policies and Separation of Church and State Ideals 
 
Gore served in Vietnam, Bush did not. Bush went UA. Gore did not. Gore is strong on 
environment. Bush is not. 
 
I voted for the candidate I felt would best serve the nation with the values I hold. 
 
I am an advocate of Social Security/Affirmative Action. Thus, the Republican party tends 
not to support either. 
 
Weak for Gore 
 





I vote third party. Both Gore and Bush's platforms were just rhetoric that was not going to 
be transformed into r 
 
My vote went to neither the Democratic candidate nor the Republican candidate as a 
protest vote. 
 
I voted Libertarian to vote against the mainstream parties 
 
MCCAIN IN 2004! 
 
Weak for Bush 
 
Since I don't know either of the candidates personally, I relied on the media for my view 
on the candidates. 
 
Lesser of two evils (by a whole lot) 
 
Two deployments under Clinton enforcing an unclear foreign policy toward Iraq. 
 
Economic policy, stand on abortion and welfare-related issues, and foreign policy 
 




Backlash against distorted media focus on non-issues. 
 
McCain dropped out so I had to choose someone else. 
 
To me the republican congress made the economy better, not Clinton leadership #23, that 
influenced me to vote republican 
 
Strong for Bush 
 
I do not dwell on party affiliations. I consider myself conservative. 
 
Voting record vs. campaign rhetoric 
 
Choose the lesser of two evils. 
 
The presidency is the last bastion of integrity. President Clinton tarnished it severely, and 
got away with it. 
 
I did not vote. And don't vote. 
 
Former President Clinton hastened the moral decay of the US Military 
 
Reputation of G. W. Bush ticket affiliates (Cheney and Powell) was strong influence in 
favor of voting for him. 
 
Character is what counted most in this election after having a President with very little 
character and morals. 
 
Gore overshadowed by Clinton=great domestic policy, adequate foreign policy but 
moral/ethical base was appalling. 
 
Open homosexuality. I will leave the military when we allow social engineering to 
adversely affect readiness!! 
 
Gore seems to be a politician. Bush is a leader. The debates proved it to me. 
 
On nearly every single issue, the democrat party caters to the lazy and is pushing us 
toward a socialist state 
 
My vote was most influenced by my Christian faith and the candidate that most closely 
aligned with my faith. 
 
Question 23- Economic benefits experienced under Clinton were not attributable to his 
leadership. 
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Would have voted for Allen Keys, but I didn't think he could win. 
 
Registered Republican for primary voting purposes, consider myself independent 
Educated Voter most important! 
 
Voted for the candidate that would make the right decisions in office 
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